There is good reason to require an accused who wants to invoke his or her right to remain silent to do so unambiguously. A requirement of an unambiguous invocation of Miranda rights results in an objective inquiry that avoid[s] difficulties of proof and ... provide[s] guidance to officers on how to proceed in the face of ambiguity. If an ambiguous act, omission, or statement could require police to end the interrogation, police would be required to make difficult decisions about an accused unclear intent and face the consequence of suppression if they guess wrong. Suppression of a voluntary confession in these circumstances would place a significant burden on society interest in prosecuting criminal activity.

In 1966, the court held in Miranda v. Arizona [opinion text] that "[i]f the individual indicates in any manner, at any time prior to or during questioning, that he wishes to remain silent, the interrogation must cease." The present case arose after Van Chester Thompkins was arrested and questioned for nearly three hours, but remained substantively silent during the questioning. He confessed to the murder after officers began speaking with him about religion. The respondent was convicted of murder at a jury trial, but the Sixth Circuit overturned the conviction when he appealed seeking habeas corpus relief on the basis that his Fifth Amendment [text] rights had been violated.