The US Supreme Court [official website] heard oral arguments in two cases on Tuesday. In Lynch v. Dimaya [transcript, PDF] the court is deciding whether 18 USC § 16(b) [text], which defines a crime of violence, is unconstitutionally vague. Section 16(b) has been incorporated [SCOTUSBlog materials] into the Immigration and Nationality Act provision governing an alien’s removal from the US. Petitioner argued that § 16(b) is not unconstitutionally vague for two reasons. First, the standard of vagueness is less in an immigration proceeding than a criminal proceeding. Second, the court’s decision in Loecal v. Ashcroft [opinion, PDF] applies a standard to § 16(b) that is not unconstitutional. Respondent argued that § 16(b) is too vague and petitioner’s arguments are irrelevant due to a severe circuit split over the issue. Furthermore, respondent pointed out that the Supreme Court has held two critical factors when determining unconstitutionality in these matters: 1) hypothesizing the ordinary case of a set of elements and 2) estimating the degree of risk of some sort. Respondent argues that both matters are present in this instance and therefore 16(b) is unconstitutional.

The court also heard [transcript, PDF] Midland Funding v. Johnson [SCOTUSBlog materials], which questioned whether a federal fair-debt-collection-practice (FDCP) statute applies to stale claims filed by debt-buyers in bankruptcy court. Petitioner argued that the Bankruptcy Code create a right to file a proof of claim for an extinguisher time-barred debt in a bankruptcy proceeding. Furthermore, that the FDCP does not prohibit filing a proof of claim for an unextinguished time-barred debt and to the extent that the FDCP could be read to prohibit filing a proof of claim for an unextinguished time-barred debt, the Bankruptcy codes precludes such an application. Respondent argues that Petitioner is flooding the market with these time-barred debt and that under the Bankruptcy Code, such debts are unenforceable and will lose a hundred percent of the time if anyone objects. Furthermore, there is currently no scenario where Midland can collect unless the system breaks down. Therefore, a debt collector must have a good faith belief that they have a right to payment under the code and if they have a reasonable basis to believe that an affirmative defense does not apply, then they don’t violate the FDCP.