US federal appeals court upholds Connecticut ban on sexually explicit materials in prisons News
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US federal appeals court upholds Connecticut ban on sexually explicit materials in prisons

The US Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed a lower court ruling Thursday that held inmates in Connecticut prisons do not have a First Amendment right to view or possess pictorial sexually explicit materials.

The case involved a challenge to an administrative directive promulgated in 2012 that banned possession of pictorial sexually explicit materials, save in cases where the material has artistic, literary, educational or scientific merit. Prior to the directive, inmates had been allowed to possess but not display such material, although displays were common. Prison officials cited the creation of a sexually-charged atmosphere as the reason for the ban, noting that prisoners would masturbate in front of staff, particularly female staff, leading to a hostile work environment.

Seven inmates brought the lawsuit, challenging the constitutionality of the directive under the First Amendment. The district court found that the directive did not violate the prisoners’ rights, nor was the directive unconstitutionally vague. The prisoners then appealed, arguing that the lower court did not properly weigh their rights against the interests espoused by the Connecticut Department of Corrections. They also asserted that the lower court incorrectly concluded that the exception for artistic content was not vague, arguing that the exception is a subjective standard that leads to arbitrary enforcement by prison officials.

The court held that the directive was rationally related to several government interests, including providing a non-hostile work environment for staff, enhancing the safety and security of prisons and facilitating the rehabilitation of sex offenders. The court also found the directive to be neutral in its application. As to the prisoners’ vagueness challenge, the court found that the definitions in the directive were sufficiently clear to a reasonable person and that the ordinary person could determine whether material qualified under the artistic exception.