Edited by: Alanah Vargas | JURIST Staff, US

Sri Lanka’s civil war (1983-2009) between government forces and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), a separatist Tamil militant and political organization fighting for an independent Tamil state, claimed 80,000-100,000 lives by UN estimates, with its legacy of displacement and land dispossession still affecting various minority groups today. In September 2024, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD) became President of Sri Lanka, and his National People’s Power (NPP) coalition — led by the leftist Janatha Vimukthi Peramuna (JVP) — won a supermajority in November’s parliamentary elections.

Despite campaign promises by AKD for a new constitution, devolution of powers, and return of government confiscated land to address the grievances of the minority communities, the new government has drawn criticism for its slow actions on land returns and constitutional reform.

In this interview, JURIST Senior Editor for Long-Form Content Pitasanna Shanmugathas speaks with Mahendran Thiruvarangan, a senior lecturer at the University of Jaffna Department of Linguistics and English. With a PhD from the City University of New York, Thiruvarangan’s scholarship focuses on postcolonial literatures, land and literature, radical democracy, and nationalism. As a Commissioner on the People’s Alliance for Right to Land (PARL), he offers unique insights into land rights challenges facing Sri Lanka’s minority communities and the prospects for meaningful change under the new government.

Pitasanna Shanmugathas: To our readers at JURIST, can you explain the purpose of the People’s Alliance for Right to Land and describe the work you do for them?

Mahendran Thiruvarangan: The People’s Alliance for Right to Land (PARL) is an umbrella organization that brings together different groups and movements working for the land rights of various communities. Their focus is on historically landless communities and people who lost their lands due to various processes beyond their control.

PARL works with communities, social movements, and social groups to help landless people find lands and to support the struggles of people who are trying to reclaim their lands from, among others, the military and the state. They frame their work in four different ways:

1. Land as identity – The focus here is how identity-related questions are intertwined with land rights. For instance, in the north and east of Sri Lanka, land grabs happen under the guise of archaeological initiatives that privilege Sinhalese Buddhist identities. Sometimes Tamil and Muslim people lost their lands, and Sinhalese people from other parts of the country were settled there.
2. Land and development – Government sometimes acquires land for mega development projects, dispossessing people of their habitat and livelihood. PARL supports their activism and struggles for justice and reparation.
3. Land and ecology – PARL creates awareness about projects harmful to the environment. However, they also highlight when narrow environmentalist discourses are used to dispossess people, preventing them from accessing land in the guise of protecting forests or wildlife.
4. Land as livelihood – PARL addresses how land is necessary for agricultural production and highlights challenges that people face. Sometimes people have land but lack capital to cultivate it or don’t have access to good water supply.

I became involved with PARL around 2019 when they established a Land Commission. The Commission included about 10-12 Commissioners, and I was one of them. We traveled throughout the country and listened to people’s stories and grievances regarding land and land rights. I participated in the sittings in Jaffna, Mullaitivu, and Badulla, though there were sittings across the country as well.

We published a report based on these hearings. The report is available in all three national languages [English, Sinhala, and Tamil]. PARL continues to be active, organizing meetings and supporting specific land struggles. They facilitate conversations across different land rights groups, organize and support campaigns and protests and bring people to Colombo for media briefings to ensure that southern media gives publicity to land-related issues in the north and east.

Shanmugathas: What percentage of Tamil land is currently under government occupation, military occupation?

Thiruvarangan: I don’t know the exact statistics, but people lost their lands during the civil war and even before. During the war, when people were displaced from one area to another, they couldn’t return to their homes for nearly 30 years or more in some cases. Many areas were declared high-security zones, completely denying people access to their land.

During this period, houses were demolished or damaged, and people couldn’t cultivate their land. Sometimes, land was transferred to other entities without the consent of the original owners. For example, in Thaiyiddi, a Buddhist temple was built after the end of the war on private land belonging to local community members. The land was given to a Buddhist monk by the military, and when people couldn’t access it, a group led by a Buddhist monk secretly laid the foundation for a Buddhist temple and gradually erected it.

When the government started releasing lands to civilians and people returned to these areas, they found they couldn’t reclaim lands that had been taken by the military or given to a Buddhist establishment. Some now live in rented places because they can’t access their own land.

This situation affects different communities differently. For instance, northern Muslims who were evicted by the Tamil separatist rebel group, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in 1990 returned to Jaffna after 2009. When they came back, their houses were damaged, and their families had expanded, creating a need for more land than they originally had. They faced problems of landlessness and sometimes hostility from local Tamil bureaucrats who were unwilling to facilitate their resettlement.

Some sections of Tamil nationalist bureaucrats misuse the Sri Lankan state apparatus to create obstacles to the resettlement of  the Muslim community. Local communities in Mullaitivu reported that their resettlement wasn’t facilitated, and they faced difficulties getting electricity connections. There were many restrictions on accessing basic services like electricity or digging wells for cultivation.

These challenges affect people across the North and East, not just in Jaffna.

Shanmugathas: Could you discuss past promises made by previous governments regarding land return and the difficulties your organization has faced in getting commitments fulfilled? How are you approaching this with the current government?

Thiruvarangan: People faced various hurdles when trying to reclaim their lands. Governments would say they would release lands in different phases. Later they released some portions of the high-security zones while withholding others. Sometimes certain villages or areas would be released, but people couldn’t access other areas.

Even today, people can only visit certain temples in these areas on specific days, and these places remain heavily guarded by the military. Governments make promises—the current president, Anura Kumara Dissanayake (AKD), mentioned land grab and the release of political prisoners as two problems specific to the North during his campaign in Jaffna before the parliamentary elections. There was some expectation that he would address these issues. But there has been no progress.

Before the parliamentary elections, they released a stretch of road that had been closed for nearly 30 years, but nothing significant has happened since then. We sense there’s a tussle between the government and the military establishment. Some government ministers may think it’s good to release the land, but they don’t get enough support from the military high command.

Governments generally lack the political will to properly address these issues because they fear backlash from racist elements in the South. Sometimes the governments themselves include racist ministers and Members of Parliament who discourage solutions that benefit minority communities.

Take the Thaiyiddi issue for instance. The government didn’t do much to help the people, yet extremist politicians like Sarath Weerasekara and Wimal Weerawansa, who were rejected by voters, are trying to make a comeback by exploiting this issue. Recently, Weerasekara claimed someone from the government ordered the military to leave the opening ceremony of a new building in the Thaiyiddi Buddhist temple premises, framing it as an insult to “war heroes.” Similarly, Weerawansa claimed that the Thaiyiddi Buddhist temple is an ancient Buddhist site that doesn’t belong to the local Tamil people.

The new government seems indecisive on these matters. They could do much more to create awareness in the South, especially since extreme Sinhalese nationalist forces have been thoroughly defeated and discredited in the past two to three years. This is an opportunity to educate the people about how money was wasted on nationalistic archaeological projects and chauvinistic Buddhist projects, instead of being channeled into social welfare.

When you explain the relationship between land grabs, building projects, corruption, and economic problems, people might understand the issue differently. The government should at least try to educate people about what’s happening, but they don’t seem to be doing that either. The basic issue is a lack of political will, which we’ve seen from different governments.

Shanmugathas: The JVP had historically been anti-Tamil and didn’t support federalism as a solution to address the ethnic conflict, but they’ve made a huge shift, and now Tamils have voted for the National People’s Power coalition in significant numbers, giving them a supermajority in Parliament. Could you discuss this more?

Thiruvarangan: That was a surprising outcome for me too. In the presidential elections, AKD got only about 7.5% of the votes in Jaffna. But then his popularity suddenly increased. I think people saw a different type of government coming to power, with figures like Prime Minister Harini Amarasuriya and some others in the NPP who have spoken up for minority communities’ rights and condemned racism.

When these individuals were given prominence in the new government, it inspired some confidence in the Tamil community in the north. Although the NPP hasn’t done anything to change the ethnocratic character of the state, they appeared non-discriminatory and didn’t use extreme Sinhalese nationalism in their electoral platform. They showed willingness to embrace the Tamil community and build an inclusive country.

At the same time, Tamils were disillusioned with some Tamil nationalist parties that couldn’t deliver anything in political or economic terms. They were also seen as parties engaged in in-fighting. The Tamil nationalist vote bank also became fragmented in five different directions during the last elections. Because of all these factors, the NPP emerged as the winner.

What worked in their favor was their ability to build a narrative that they are an inclusive force.

Shanmugathas: What is the mood within the northern province among Tamils, Muslims, and other minority communities five months after the NPP’s supermajority win in Parliament?

Thiruvarangan: Some people believe we should give them more time since they just came to power. Some seem happy that this government is people-friendly and is working to fight corruption. However, others are having second thoughts now. The initial overwhelming enthusiasm has tempered somewhat.

There’s a feeling that more could have been done — more lands could have been released, political prisoners could have been freed. There’s also strong criticism among both Tamils and progressives in the South that they haven’t abolished the Prevention of Terrorism Act (PTA), which was a major electoral promise. They also haven’t done anything to abolish the Executive Presidency, which remains a significant threat to democracy.

While people haven’t taken to the streets in protest yet, there’s considerable economic suffering in the peripheries due to the IMF agenda and austerity program that this government continues to implement. They’re essentially continuing the economic policies initiated during Ranil Wickremesinghe’s time.

With certain budget allocations, the government might  have tried to ease the burden somewhat, but the cost of living remains high, and public spending on education and other areas still needs improvement. The education system is facing a crisis, with universities unable to create new teaching positions, and no major infrastructure projects have been implemented in recent years.

There are demands to reduce indirect taxes, which affect ordinary people. The Frontline Socialist Party (a breakaway group from the JVP) is organizing a countrywide campaign with two key demands: abolishing the Prevention of Terrorism Act and easing the tax burden, especially on educational equipment, stationery, food items, and medicine.

Unemployment remains high, with many graduates waiting for jobs. Economically, the country is still in crisis. If this continues, the government may lose its popularity. People are patient now because it’s a new government, but the government needs to take swift measures to support low-income families, unemployed people, and historically deprived communities.

Shanmugathas: During this five-month period since the NPP’s supermajority Parliamentary win, one of the biggest issues is that despite having a supermajority, the NPP hasn’t made any moves toward constitutional reform. In 1994, when Chandrika Kumaratunga came to power during the civil war, within five months she already sought to assemble a constitutional team to formulate what would eventually become the Union of Regions proposal, a constitutional reform proposal which, to date, remains the boldest attempt to address the grievances of the minority communities. Chandrika faced higher stakes and didn’t have a majority in Parliament, yet the NPP with its supermajority hasn’t mentioned constitutional reform.

Thiruvarangan: This delay is worrying. It may be difficult for the government to introduce reforms like devolution of powers due to opposition from the South. President Kumaratunga tried to educate the masses about devolution through campaigns like “Sudu Nelum” (White Lotus), especially in the South.

However, there are other issues over which  there is countrywide consensus, like abolishing the Executive Presidency, yet they’re not addressing those issues  either. It’s really frustrating. Constitutional expert Dr. Jayampathy Wickramaratne has expressed concern, suggesting they should act soon because a later referendum on abolishing the Executive Presidency would be seen as a referendum on the government’s performance rather than on the Executive Presidency. If the government doesn’t perform well economically, it could affect political reforms.

We need to put pressure on the government. They say they’ll start a constitutional reform process next year, but we’ll have to wait and see what they propose and how they engage with the devolution question. The JVP has historically opposed devolution of powers and even tried to undermine peace processes that would devolve powers to the provinces. They even think the 13th Amendment isn’t necessary to address minority grievances.

I don’t have much hope regarding devolution, but at least other political reforms like abolishing the Executive Presidency, making the judiciary more independent, having a more democratic Constitutional Council, and ensuring non-interference in the public sector could bring some change in governance culture.

They’re also working on an educational reform process expected to be rolled out next year, but constitutional reform seems to be on the back burner for some reason.

Shanmugathas: Before their parliamentary victory, the JVP said they wouldn’t repeal the PTA, then recently said they would, but hinted at replacing it with a new act with similar elements. Shortly before their supermajority win, the JVP general secretary said devolution is “not necessary” for Tamils. Can you speak about potential consequences that may result if JVP does not act expeditiously?

Thiruvarangan: Yes, if they don’t act now, there might not be another opportunity in the near future. If they fail economically, we could see the rise of right-wing forces that would move the country in an authoritarian direction. That’s where we were heading after Gotabaya Rajapaksa was elected president, but the economic crisis intervened—a blessing in disguise—that ended that project.

The damage that could have been done during Gotabaya’s full term is unimaginable, especially with archaeological projects and land grabs that began during his time.

Shanmugathas: There has been a well-documented history of Tamil people, especially former or suspected LTTE members, facing harassment from state security forces. Is this pattern still occurring under the NPP?

Thiruvarangan: I haven’t heard of specific cases, but I’m not closely monitoring this situation—there are other activists in the North who would know better. Surveillance is still happening, though. Recently, organizers trying to screen the movie “Kuchchaveli“ in Trincomalee were visited by the CID (Criminal Investigation Department). This shows that surveillance continues despite the regime change. We need to raise these issues and have difficult conversations with all stakeholders, challenging the NPP government to do better.

Shanmugathas: We’ve seen mothers of missing children—those who were abducted and forcibly disappeared by government forces during the civil war in Sri Lanka—engage in daily protests. Has there been any receptiveness from the current government toward addressing this issue?

Thiruvarangan: No, nothing has happened. I don’t even know if the new government has met with the mothers of the disappeared  to discuss their concerns. Their struggle continues, and the mothers have been protesting for many years now.

Shanmugathas: During the civil war, many male household members were killed, leading to the emergence of female-headed households in the predominantly Tamil regions of the country. What are the social conditions of these women today?

Thiruvarangan: They face significant economic issues, especially with the current economic crisis and austerity measures. Female-headed households have been badly affected. These women often find it difficult to educate their children and find employment. There’s also a problem of indebtedness. Microfinance companies target these women with loans, causing them to fall into debt.

At the same time, you see a lot of resilience — women struggling against all odds to survive and build a future for their children.  

Shanmugathas: Regarding rehabilitation and reintegration, journalist Thulasi Muthulingam told me there was great stigma within the Tamil community toward rehabilitated LTTE soldiers, partly because some had used civilians as human shields or shot at civilians during the final stages of the war. Has this reintegration been fulfilled?

Thiruvarangan: There’s still a lot of trauma present. The rehabilitation process was painful for many ex-LTTE cadres, who sometimes faced severe torture even after surrendering. When they returned, they encountered a lack of economic opportunities and felt a sense of defeat.

There’s questioning among them: “We contributed and sacrificed a lot, and finally nothing happened – not personally for us, nor for the larger community.” That’s why the government’s lack of action and initiative remains problematic. The new government should address these issues without letting time run out.

Shanmugathas: Regarding transitional justice, more than ten truth and reconciliation commissions have been established by past governments. What’s the sentiment within minority communities about truth and reconciliation? How should the present government with its supermajority address transitional justice?

Thiruvarangan: We already have some excellent reports. During the “Good Governance” regime between 2015 and 2020, a truth and reconciliation commission was established. They produced a solid report about the suffering and atrocities experienced by different communities, based on hearings throughout the country, with good recommendations.

Even the government that appointed this commission didn’t implement its recommendations. Reports and recommendations are already available—the government needs to find the political will to implement them rather than establishing another truth and reconciliation commission.

Similarly, for political solutions, there are several proposals: Chandrika’s proposals, the APRC, the Mangala-Munasinghe proposals, and the Oslo peace talks facilitated by the Norwegian government. Much groundwork has already been done, with reports and concrete solutions available.

When the government says they’re going to start the process anew, it’s like reinventing the wheel and creates despair among people. Everyone knows substantial work has already been done—why start over?

Shanmugathas: Is there anything you’d like our international JURIST readership to take away? How can they contribute to raising awareness about your struggle? Is there an international connection that should be fostered in advocating for the rights of Tamil and minority communities that have lost their land?

Thiruvarangan: The struggles we have in Sri Lanka need solidarity from progressive groups in different parts of the world. Palestine is getting a lot of attention now, but the land grabs still underway in the northern and eastern parts of Sri Lanka also deserve attention. This isn’t just about Tamil and Muslim communities but also the Malaiyaha Tamil community [Indian Tamil people of Sri Lanka brought to the country under colonial rule as indentured workers  by the British] in the Hill Country, who have been fighting for wage increases, proper housing, and good healthcare facilities.

When external support comes, it should encourage more collaboration between different ethnic groups to work together on these struggles. Sometimes sections of the diaspora encourage divisive, hyper-nationalistic politics. This happens within the local Tamil community as well. When offering solidarity, it’s important to highlight the importance of working together across ethnic divisions and building stronger Tamil-Muslim relations, this is  necessary to fight the oppressive practices of the state.

Shanmugathas: I’ve personally witnessed hyper-nationalism in the diaspora. I’m a strong proponent of federalism as the solution to address the grievances of the Tamil community and I am opposed to a separate ethno-nationalist state, which I don’t see as practical or feasible. I believe grassroots mobilization can bring a government to power that will acknowledge minority grievances. Now that the NPP has come to power as a result of grassroots mobilization, many in the diaspora are saying, “They’re not doing anything on constitutional reform, so this proves only a separate ethno-nationalist state is the answer to address the Tamil community’s grievances.” I maintain this isn’t viable and lacks international support.

Thiruvarangan: We have to actively question Tamil nationalism because it also produces its own exclusions. What’s the point of having another ethno-nationalist state in response to the hegemony of one ethno-nationalist state? I don’t see that as a solution.

Even if you want a separate state, it should be a different kind of state that includes all communities and recognizes the ethno-religious diversity and plurality of the northern and eastern parts of the country. We have the bloody history of the eviction of Muslims – similar to the genocide that Tamils faced. The nation-state and nationalist state always produce violence against other people. We should recognize that it’s a failed model everywhere in the world and shouldn’t embrace it as our future.

Shanmugathas: Thank you so much for speaking with me.

Thiruvarangan: It was a pleasure speaking with you.