Putin spent more than four hours on Thursday chatting with journalists and constituents about matters ranging from Moscow’s endgame in Ukraine to Putin’s favorite Russian salad. Talk of Russia’s nuanced interpretations of international law featured prominently in the discussion and offered insights into the calculus driving Putin’s continued aggression in Ukraine. Below, we outline key takeaways from the event to spotlight how the Russian leader’s understanding of international law continues to inform his often unpredictable foreign, military and security policies. Each section of indented text is a direct quote, drawn from the Kremlin’s official translation of the event.

Putin’s answer to a question about the “changing the world order based on so-called rules, primarily Western rules” encapsulated a core philosophy that continues to drive Russian aggression abroad. In his view, many in the world have tired of the post-World War II global order, dominated by a UN that faces increasing criticism for its ineffectiveness:

As for the rules-based world order, there are no such rules in reality. They change every day depending on the current political situation and the immediate interests of whoever is talking about it. How will this affect the situation? It will affect it in the right direction. It will show that there are quite a large number of forces in the world, powerful countries that want to live not by these unwritten rules, but by the rules prescribed in fundamental documents, including the Charter of the United Nations, and those that are guided by their own interests and the interests of their partners. They do not impose anything on anyone, do not create any military blocs, but create conditions for joint effective development.

This line of reasoning is notable when paired with Putin’s interpretation of international law as it applies to Ukraine, particularly concerning sovereignty and territorial integrity.

The UN Charter states, in relevant part, “The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members,” and “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” Given Ukraine’s status as a sovereign nation and a member of the UN, a literal interpretation of the territorial integrity clause would indicate that Russia’s invasion was in clear violation of, to quote Putin, “the rules prescribed in fundamental documents, including the Charter of the United Nations.”

The apparent disconnect here is attributable to Putin’s nuanced understanding of the Ukraine conflict, which he sees not as an act of Western aggression but as a response to an existential threat.

Echoing his oft-repeated refrain about the origins of the war, Putin said Russia had to invade Ukraine because the West “staged a state coup” in 2014 (referring to the Maidan Revolution, which led to the ouster of Kremlin-friendly leader Viktor Yanukovych) and pushed NATO expansion to a point that he felt posed an existential threat to Russia:

That [ed: the Maidan Revolution, or as Putin chooses to view it, the “coup”] combined with a burning urge to creep up to our borders and drag Ukraine into NATO – all of this has led to the tragedy. In addition, there has been bloodshed in [Donbas] for eight years. All this taken together has led to the tragedy that we are now experiencing. They forced us to take these actions.

The key here is the recognition that, according to Putin, these factors combined to rob Ukraine of its sovereignty:

So, as I say, in a situation where the United States conceived and orchestrated this act with Europe standing by and averting its gaze, or playing along and singing along with them, how can we build relations with them in these circumstances? … [Ukrainians have] lost their sovereignty to a large extent, as we can see now, and they are making many decisions to their own detriment. To their own detriment! But they do it, nonetheless.

This logic appears central to reconciling Putin’s views of Russia’s imperative to continue the war it waged against Ukraine and the supremacy of international law. This all militated toward his emphasis on the need for a more multipolar world order.

Putin described the US as “an important country on the world stage,” but one whose “absolutely imperial policy … is bad for them.” He argued at multiple junctures throughout the event that many around the world want change, perhaps most memorably illustrated by the following exchange:

Question: Today our country and you personally are being denigrated and insulted in the world. Do you think that in the future someone from some German town will say: “Damn, Putin did everything right.”

Putin: Why just a German city? I not only believe, I know that not only in German cities, but also in many other cities in Europe, and in the United States, not to mention other regions of the world, many people believe that we are doing everything right. We are not afraid to fight for our national interests without encroaching on others. And a lot of people support this. … we have a huge number of supporters in the world for the way we protect our traditional values. And the number of them is increasing exponentially.

This response can be interpreted in multiple ways. In one sense, it is a nod to his belief in the broad appeal of a more multipolar world order. On the other, it likely hints at Russia’s history of cracking down on LGBTQ+ rights and other causes championed by foreign conservatives.

But when asked if the current hostilities in Gaza evidence the functional obsolescence of the UN, Putin signaled optimism in the organization, if only as an organ for seeking consensus:

The United Nations was initially created for the purpose of finding a consensus. Without a consensus, decisions cannot be made. So, nothing out of the ordinary is happening at the UN; it was always like this, especially during the Cold War. There is a reason why Foreign Minister of the USSR [Andrei] Gromyko had the nickname, Mr. No, because the Soviet Union very frequently vetoed decisions. It is very significant. When there is a veto, no steps that a country sees as hostile towards itself will be taken. And it is important … to preserve such mechanisms in the UN; otherwise it will simply be reduced to a talking shop as happened during a certain period after World War I. But it does not mean that we cannot and should not seek these consensuses.

The post-World War I reference presumably referred to the League of Nations, the inability of which to stop World War II ultimately led to the UN’s creation.

Few beyond the reach of Russian state television would likely agree with Putin’s interpretations of the core doctrines of international law. These views have cost Russia an estimated 315,000 casualties, according to Reuters, citing US intelligence sources—a staggering figure that might inspire many who claim to be as patriotic as Putin does to consider seeking peaceful solutions in line with the rules-based order he claims to want to revive.

Alas, among the more poignant examples of Putin’s views on the rules-based order was an apparently sarcastic quip on the heels of a New York Times journalist’s complaint that Western journalists have largely been blocked from high-level press conferences, like this one, for the past year. “It is Mr. Peskov’s fault,” he said to laughter from the crowd, referring to his longtime press secretary Dmitry Peskov. “I am an open person with democratic beliefs and views,” he said.