In a move that would shake up the face of British democracy, the new Labour Government has proposed to expel all 92 remaining hereditary peers from the House of Lords. This legislative push is part of a broader manifesto commitment by the Labour Party to comprehensively reform the House of Lords. This includes introducing a retirement age for life peers, reducing the size of the upper chamber, and eventually creating a more representative body. Currently, the House of Lords houses around 800 members, in stark comparison to the 650-seat House of Commons. Here we explore whether this us a transformative stride towards modernising British democracy, or eroding the constitutional processes that for. the bed-rock of British Constitution Law and the rule of law.
This proposed reform may present an opportunity to address historical inequalities and enhance the democratic fabric of the United Kingdom, ensuring that parliamentary representation is based on merit rather than inheritance, but it could also be seen as a step towards a less democratic second chamber. To this end, this reform perhaps looks better on paper than it actually is. Although the steps taken to remove Peers based solely on a right they inherited from our Upper Chamber is a step towards better representing the makeup of our country; in removing hereditary peers, we remove the only group of people in the House of Lords who are not put their virtue of their good deeds. Further questions are raised by Labour’s proposed reforms: namely, what purpose should the House of Lords serve? and whether a politicised chamber, which moves us one step closer to being democratically elected, is actually beneficial for serving said purpose or not.
Historical context
The concept of elites in the country having political power is not a new one, and was one that was developed over centuries of monarchy in the UK. Up until the fourteenth century, monarchs were informally advised by groups of appointed political leaders and religious leaders. In the fourteenth century, two distinct houses of parliament began to emerge, although they were a far cry from how we know them today. The House of Commons was made up of representatives of towns and counties, and the House of Lords continued as the playground for the King’s friends. Each Prince would grow up surrounded by the Lord’s sons, and they would inherit hereditary power together, be that as King or as peers in the House of Lords.
Eventually, the House of Lords began to lose its political power to the House of Commons. Up until 1909, the House of Lords had the power to veto legislation it didn’t like, and put this to use on many occasions in ways that were unfavourable for the general population. One such occasion (and the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back for the House of Commons) was the veto of the ‘people’s budget’ proposed in 1909, a measure introduced by David Lloyd George to raise £7 million for old age pensions by taxing the richer members of society. For obvious reasons, the House of Lords did not like that. Shortly afterwards, the House of Commons introduced the 1911 Parliament Act, which removed the right of the House of Lords to veto laws, but allowed them to delay them for up to two years. The subsequent 1949 Parliament Act further limited the powers of the House of Lords to reducing their delaying powers to one year. The finals crack in the power of the House of Lords to prevent the passage of legislation came in the form of the self-imposed Salisbury Convention, which stated that as a general rule the House of Lords would agree to pass all bills that came before them, in recognition of their limited democratic power.
Despite the limited power of the House of lords, and possibly because of it, hereditary peers remain a feature of it to this day. The legal and constitutional framework of the House of Lords is uniquely complex due to the UK’s unwritten constitution, which relies on historical conventions and statutes. The number of hereditary peers was limited by the labour government in 1999 through the crucial House of Lords Act 1999 to 92 hereditary peers who would be democratically elected from a pool of a possible 750 hereditary peers. This stopgap measure was intended as a temporary solution until a more permanent one was reached to the democratic deficit in the House of Lords, underscoring the slow pace and challenges inherent in constitutional reform within the UK. Today, as we navigate the complexities of a 21st-century democracy, the idea that legislative power could be inherited rather than earned seems increasingly anachronistic. The existence of hereditary peers, who inherit their positions in the House of Lords, stands as a remnant of a bygone era.
A step away from aristocracy towards meritocracy?
The ongoing existence of hereditary peers poses significant questions about equity and representation. In a society that champions equality and meritocracy, the hereditary principle contradicts these values. The inherent lack of accountability of hereditary peers, who unlike elected members, are immune to electoral processes, diminishes their legitimacy and the legitimacy of their legislative contributions.
Opponents of the suggested labour reform often cite traditions and the perceived need for continuity. They argue that hereditary peers bring diverse experiences to the House, yet this assertion is undermined by the socio-economic homogeneity of the group, which is predominantly composed of older, white men from aristocratic backgrounds.
The government’s proposal to abolish hereditary peers aligns with a broader initiative to democratize and contemporize the second chamber. Alternatives being considered include expanding the number of life peers based on expertise and possibly establishing a fully or partially elected second chamber. Such reforms would address the chronic issues of legitimacy and accountability in the House of Lords, enriching the legislative process with diverse perspectives and democratised legitimacy.
The bill, expected to be debated extensively once it reaches the Lords after passing through the Commons, reflects the UK’s ongoing commitment to reform. By abolishing hereditary peers, the UK joins the ranks of global democracies committed to ensuring that governance and legislative power are accessible to those qualified by merit, not by the accident of birth.
This reform represents not just a modernization of an institution but a reaffirmation of the UK’s commitment to egalitarian and democratic principles. As the nation moves forward, it is imperative that its institutions evolve in ways that reflect modern values and serve to inspire confidence and inclusivity in all its citizens. Aligning its parliamentary system with these ideals is not only necessary but also essential for a just and equitable society.
Criticisms of the reform
The government’s recent proposal to expel all 92 remaining hereditary peers from the House of Lords has stirred significant debate, prompting concerns about the potential pitfalls of such a move. While the initiative is heralded as a step towards modernizing British democracy, there are arguments suggesting that the reform could inadvertently undermine certain democratic principles and traditions that contribute to the legislative process.
One of the key arguments against the removal of hereditary peers is the potential loss of continuity and historical perspective they bring to the legislative body. Hereditary peers provide a link to the UK’s long-standing traditions and history, often offering insights derived from generations of political and civic engagement. This historical continuity can enrich debates and introduce a depth of understanding that might otherwise be absent in a parliamentary system increasingly driven by short-term electoral cycles and political expediency.
Moreover, the hereditary peerage system allows for a form of representation not tied to political party agendas or electoral pressures. Unlike life peers and elected officials, hereditary peers can contribute to debates from a position of relative independence, free from the obligation to adhere to party lines or cater to voter bases. This can foster more nuanced discussions and facilitate the consideration of long-term implications of legislation rather than focusing solely on immediate political gains.
Critics also caution against the loss of unique expertise and perspectives inherent in the hereditary peerage. While it is true that hereditary peers are predominantly drawn from a particular socio-economic background, many have cultivated distinct areas of expertise that contribute valuably to legislative discussions. Their diverse knowledge across various fields can enrich the legislative process, providing insights beyond the scope of professional politicians or appointed life peers.
Furthermore, by removing hereditary peers, the House of Lords risks becoming more heavily populated by life peers who are often political appointees. This could potentially skew the balance of power in favour of the ruling party, thus diminishing the House’s role as an independent revising chamber intended to scrutinise and amend proposed legislation across party lines. By maintaining hereditary peers, the House of Lords can preserve a non-partisan element that serves as a check on political motives dominating legislative processes.
Additionally, some argue that targeting hereditary peers for reform overlooks more pressing needs within the House of Lords, such as reducing its size or ensuring a more equitable gender and ethnic composition among life peers. By focusing on removing hereditary peers, efforts and resources may be diverted from these broader, systemic reforms, which could more significantly enhance the democratic functionality of the House.
Finally, this proposal could set a precedent for dismissing long-standing traditions without fully considering alternative solutions that could maintain the beneficial aspects of hereditary involvement while addressing democratic shortcomings. Instead of abolishing hereditary peerage outright, a considered approach might involve reforming the system to blend traditional roles with modern expectations, such as introducing merit-based assessments for hereditary peer succession.
The overarching issue
Most of the criticisms above of the proposed reform are symptoms of a larger issue; the UK increasingly has no idea what to do with its upper house.
The House of Lords has been justified as a reviewing and scrutinising body, but it falls short in this regard. This is not to say that the House of Lords never acts as a constitutional watchdog; it does. However, the perceived illegitimacy of the House of Lords as an institution, exactly because it is unelected and does not represent demographically the UK, means that it has been weakened repeatedly over the years, to the extent where its powers of scrutiny and review are now relatively weak. The Parliament Acts and the Salisbury Convention are examples of this.
Another such example is the 2015 Strathclyde review. The Strathclyde review was established in 2015 after the Commons felt that the Lords had vetoed too many statutory instruments. The review suggested removing the power of veto over statutory instruments entirely. Statutory instruments are a form of secondary legislation, which parliament delegates to the government. It essentially gives the government legislative powers, which threatens the separation of powers and hands even more power to the executive. They are necessary in order to ensure legislative efficiency, but must be carefully reviewed in order to prevent an abuse of power by the state. The House of Lords has historically acted as the scrutinising body for such delegated legislation. Therefore, the suggestion in the Strathclyde review would massively undermine the power of the House of Lords to hold the government accountable, an especially scary thought, since roughly 3500 statutory instruments are passed a year. Although the suggestions made in the Strathclyde review were was not implemented, the then Prime Minister made threats that he would implement it if the House of Lords continued to exercise their power of veto. The Strathclyde review goes to show that it is difficult for anybody, the courts or the House of Lords, to hold the House of Commons accountable is the House of Commons threatens to legislate to prevent them from doing so.
However, introducing further legal powers for the House of Lords to hold the House of Commons or the government accountable would produce massive and unprecedented political outcry. Fundamentally, parliament doesn’t want to be held accountable by any body other than itself. Parliamentary privilege allows parliament to control its own proceedings, providing parliament with the right to discipline its own members unless they commit a criminal offence. This is one of many examples of parliament’s desire for only itself to hold it accountable. Others include the ministerial code, ministerial accountability and expelling of members. Parliament can even technically hold its members in custody. The measures of parliamentary privilege even extend to protect MPs from search of their office by warrant unless this is authorised by a senior member of the house.
As such, with the House of Lord’s relative ineffectiveness as a reviewing body, keeping it independent from the political process appears pointless. Large scale change and reform to the House of Lords is necessary because it is currently a rather pointless institution. Whether this review is committing to strengthening the reviewing powers of the House of Lords or instead committing to creating a second elected chamber is not yet clear.
A second elected chamber?
Despite the importance of peers being appointed based on their merits, there have been calls for overhauling the entire structure of the House of Lords and instead creating a second representatively elected body.
As Baroness Jenny Jones writes in an article with the Guardian:
“I…find the latest meagre reform from Labour slightly puzzling…It won’t solve the many problems with our current unelected chamber. It is typical gesture politics, which will briefly look good, cause plenty of hassle with painful debates to get the legislation through, but not actually achieve very much. Our House will remain undemocratic, overcrowded, dominated by silly archaic practices and unrepresentative of the British population. We need a second chamber that is representative of the regions, elected by a form of proportional representation and operating in a modern parliamentary building”.
It is not unprecedented to have two elected bodies. In the USA, both the House of Representatives and the Senate are directly elected. The biggest issue with electing the House of Lords, however, is that in politicising the body it becomes less of an unbiased venue for debate and review of legislation. It is easily imaginable that if the House of Lords were elected, that its composition would mirror the political parties in the House of Commons, thus likely reducing the scrutiny the House of Lords would apply to the government.
In conclusion, while the proposal to remove hereditary peers seeks to modernise the House of Lords, it also raises concerns about losing historical continuity, diminishing independent perspectives, and potentially increasing political partisanship within the chamber. As the debate unfolds, it is crucial to weigh these considerations carefully and explore solutions that preserve democratic balance while adapting to contemporary standards of governance. It is time to give serious consideration to all voices in the debate on what we should do with the House of Lords, and work towards a reform that makes it a more efficient, effective, and fair body.
