From Gaza to Uvalde: The Complicated Moral Imperative to Rescue Our Own Commentary
From Gaza to Uvalde: The Complicated Moral Imperative to Rescue Our Own

In the aftermath of the recent rescue of four Israeli hostages held in Gaza since Oct. 7, 2023, an analysis of such extraction operations is warranted. To put this event in context, three things must be understood. First, hostage taking is a war crime. Second, hostage rescue is extremely logistically difficult. Third, the American public would want their people rescued too, as past experience has shown.

Americans know the pain and consequences of hostage-taking and the challenges of hostage recovery. A rescue mission of this nature requires the most accurate target discrimination and puts ground forces at the greatest risk. To illustrate the stakes and challenges of such missions, recall the events surrounding the Uvalde, Texas, school shootings, and the 444-day Iran hostage crisis that began in 1979.

On May 24, 2022, 18-year-old Salvador Ramos entered Robb Elementary School in Uvalde, Texas. By the time the day was over, Ramos had fatally shot 19 students and two teachers and injured 17 others. Police officers on the scene waited for more than 75 minutes before entering the classroom to engage the active shooter. Outside the school, desperate parents clashed with the police, who prevented them from attempting to rescue their own children in response to the perception of police inaction.

After the tragedy, The Texas House of Representatives investigated the event and concluded that the police response was replete with system failures and egregiously poor decision-making. They criticized the police for prioritizing their own safety over the lives of innocent victims. Chief Pedro Arredondo of the Uvalde School District Police was fired.

Why the police failed to breach the active shooter earlier was likely a combination of fear and a lack of training. Police inaction may not have been a legal violation per se; In the 2005 decision Castle Rock v. Gonzalez, the Supreme Court controversially deferred to police discretion, ruling that the police do not have a constitutional duty to enforce restraining orders and, by extension, do not have a constitutional duty to protect the public in all cases. Still, police inaction in Uvalde has given way to deep-seated anger and shame. To many, the delay in the police response feels unforgivable. You can lose a fight, but you can’t be incompetent. The public will more likely forgive brave sanguinary actions, but never the meek.

Police may not be required to risk their lives to save yours, but a solider in wartime lawfully ordered into a dangerous battle cannot refuse. On Nov. 4, 1979, a group of militarized Iranian college students took over the US Embassy in Tehran, Iran. They captured and held several dozen US diplomats and citizens for the next 444 days. US President Jimmy Carter referred to the hostage-taking  as “blackmail” and to the hostages as “victims of terrorism and anarchy.”

Hostage-taking is prohibited under international humanitarian law and is a war crime. On Apr. 24, 1980, Carter ordered the US armed forces to rescue the hostages in Operation Eagle Claw. The mission was a spectacular failure, and instead of freeing any hostages, eight US servicemen were killed.

Operation Eagle Claw was a joint US military and intelligence mission that drew together forces from the Army, Navy, Marines, and Airforce, as well as CIA officers. The political fallout was enormous and likely a core reason Carter failed to win re-election. The hostages were ultimately released by Iran on the day of the presidential inauguration of Ronald Reagan. The mission failure was likely due to a coordination problem between different capabilities and units.

Planning for a joint force operation is extremely difficult, particularly when it comes to time and space. The failure of the raid led to the creation of the Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC). In the 444 days of the hostage drama, the shame of the American public was profound. The mission failure left a deep stain on the confidence of US domestic and international stature. Though the Iranian hostage takers did not achieve any of their demands with the US, the incident fueled anti-Americanism, the effects of which reverberate today.

In defense of Operation Eagle Claw, the public likely underappreciates just how complicated and improbable the success of hostage rescue missions is. Hollywood would have the public believe such missions are inevitably successful against all odds.  In truth, shooting a gun accurately and confidently at another human being is hard. Leading a group of soldiers through an open field is hard. A successful joint rescue operation requires many detailed and coordinated elements. In ground operations, it is preferred to lead with coordinated fire and explosive munitions before putting in ground forces, but in hostage rescue, surprise and speed are essential. Good intelligence provides the compound’s layout, estimated “slant” (size, location, activity, number of troops and civilians) to the room, and specific locations of the hostages. When hostages and civilians are present in the same place, the fighting force is at greatest risk.

Once a raid has started, hostage takers can opt to kill the hostages or move them to another, even more dangerous position. Consequently, the rescue operation cannot provide any warning that would lead to harming the hostages or alerting the enemy force. In the Israeli operation, target discrimination was extremely difficult as the hostages were held in civilian apartment buildings and actually living in the homes of civilians who were cooperating with Hamas and guarded by combatants disguised in civilian clothing.

It is much easier if you know you can indiscriminately shoot anyone who is there, or at least any adult male, with the assumption that they are enemy fighters. Every decision and every action must be made fast and with a level of precision that requires the highest level of mastery. By the time the operation begins, the actual killing is a given. An effective plan considers every contingency, getting in and out, minimizing civilian casualties, and avoiding friendly fire.

In the Israeli rescue operation, two simultaneous raids in two separate locations occurred, thereby exponentially increasing the complexity and the risk. During the hostage rescue mission, Israeli forces engaged in a fierce battle all the way to the extraction point. In some circles, outrage has been leveled against Israel because hundreds of people may have been killed in order to save four. However, loss of life in this instance reflects the circumstances on the ground and the complexity of hostage rescue and not a disregard for human life on the part of Israel.

If a civilian is holding a hostage, that civilian is in the fight. Questions might be raised as to whether civilian hostage holders were forced into the role. To this, time may tell. From the Israeli military perspective – and no doubt the US military perspective – the message to the enemy is:  if you have taken and are holding our people, we will do whatever is required to free them, and you may be killed. Since Oct. 7, it has been hard to fully appreciate the degree of trauma felt by the citizens of Israel. Like the US, Israel, owes a duty to its citizens to rescue them if they are unlawfully taken hostage.

With this hostage rescue, Israel has made its policy firmly clear. America aspires to share this policy. If one were to imagine an official statement by Israel after this raid, it would likely say, “We did a hostage raid to rescue our people. We attempted to minimize casualties, but that was not our main objective. If you hold our people hostage, we will find you, kill you, and set them free.”

Joel Zivot is a practicing physician in anesthesiology and intensive care medicine and a senior fellow in ethics at Emory University in Atlanta, Georgia. Zivot is a recognized expert who advocates against the use of lethal injection in the death penalty and is against the use of the tools of medicine as an arm of state power. Follow him on “X”/Twitter @joel_zivot

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