As a woman entering the job market, I expect to be judged by my merits and qualifications for the job, not by how attractive I appear to my employer. This expectation is rooted in the 50 years of social progress that stemmed from the enactment of Title VII. It is true that we have come a long way from women being expressly denied jobs on the sole basis of their sex or race, however we also have a long way to go. For example, women like Debrahlee Lorenzana and Lauren Odes have been the victims of appearance discrimination in the workplace for being too attractive. Lorenzana was fired from a Citibank branch in 2009 because her body was “too distracting” to her male coworkers and supervisors. Similarly Odes was fired from a lingerie company Native Intimates in 2012 because of her distracting physical features, i.e. her large breasts. Although Lorenzana and Odes wore clothing similar to their coworkers, their supervisors found them too attractive for employment. These women, and many more in similar positions, deserve an equal opportunity to secure employment as other individuals. They have a right to be evaluated based on performance rather than appearance. Federal and state courts should interpret Title VII’s provisions against sex discrimination in employment practices to include a prohibition against attractiveness discrimination, as it negatively affects women.
When I began research on this issue, I was very skeptical of my own thesis. “Discrimination against attractive women?” I thought that the more attractive the woman is, the higher her chance of securing employment. However, this was my misconception, also shared by popular thought. Although it is a counterintuitive thought, studies (PDF) have shown that some attractive women are more adversely affected by discriminatory employment practices based on appearance than unattractive women. Some of these studies (PDF) also show that it does not matter whether the position sought requires specific appearance qualities necessary to perform employee’s obligations, for example a position that requires public contact versus an office job with minimal public contact. Attractive women are being discriminated against in those positions as well. Moreover, studies (PDF) show that not only do women tend to see attractive women as a threat, but also men feel threatened by attractive women, especially in traditionally male-dominated employment environment.
Title VII specifically protects against sex discrimination. So, if women are specifically being discriminated against for being attractive, why shouldn’t Title VII protect them? Only a few local municipal codes currently address and prohibit appearance discrimination in employment. In addition, appearance discrimination is broader than attractiveness discrimination as it may include discrimination on the basis of physical disabilities, height, weight and apparel. The above municipal codes encompass attractiveness discrimination based on a woman’s physical appearance. However, this provides only limited protection to the women living in those jurisdictions. Federal and state laws do not address such issues.
Some critics may question the need to protect women from attractiveness discrimination by asking whether these protections are going too far. Is Title VII soon to be interpreted broadly enough to cover any and every characteristic? To answer this question, we should examine the intent of Congress when they enacted Title VII and explore shortcomings in its application. This is exactly what our society has done during the past 50 years. The Supreme Court has interpreted Title VII broadly in order to effectuate Congress’s intent to prohibit employment practices that adversely affect women. For example, in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, the Supreme Court held that an employer acting on sex stereotypes that women are not aggressive violated Title VII. In Dothard v. Rawlinson, the Supreme Court interpreted Title VII as prohibiting discrimination based on height and weight as it adversely affected women.
In both Price Waterhouse and Dothard, the employer actions had a negative impact on women. Reacting to these developments, the Supreme Court repeatedly held that such employment practices were in violation of Title VII. Therefore given the purpose of Title VII and the Supreme Court’s subsequent decisions, attractiveness discrimination against women should be interpreted as a violation of Title VII’s prohibition against discriminatory employment practices on the basis of sex.
However, an exception should be made to the instances where employment practices based on appearance are a business necessity, e.g. the entertainment industry with actors and models specifically. The purpose of this exception is to protect certain businesses from the inability to perform their primary function—entertaining. As it is relevant for the entertainment industry, social standards of beauty play an integral role in how actors and models are hired. Apart from this exception, women should be protected from the adverse effects of attractiveness discrimination in employment through Title VII’s existing provisions against sex discrimination.
Pardis Camarda earned a B.A. from Stony Brook University with a double-major in Political Science and Sociology and a minor in Women’s and Gender Studies. Pardis is currently participating in the Pro-Bono Scholars Program and is a Senior Staff Member of the Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development.
Suggested citation: Pardis Camarda, A Woman’s Right To Secure Employment Despite Her Beauty, JURIST – Student Commentary, Nov. 18, 2014, http://jurist.org/student/2014/11/pardis-camarda-title-vii.php.
This article was prepared for publication by Christina Alam, an Assistant Editor for JURIST Commentary. Please direct any questions or comments to her at commentary@jurist.org