The Supreme Court began the October 2017 term with oral arguments [day call, PDF] in two cases, one concerning employment dispute arbitration and the other concerning criminal-removal in immigration proceedings.

The first, Epic Systems Corp. v. Lewis [SCOTUSblog materials; transcript], questions the applicability and scope of two federal statutes: the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) [text, PDF] and the Nation Labor Relations Act (NLRA) [text]. The question is whether arbitration agreements in employment contracts are “valid, irrevocable, and enforceable” [SCOTUS Blog] under the FAA, notwithstanding the NLRA.

Arbitration agreements often include individual dispute resolution clauses, which require the employee or employer to settle any disputes through individual arbitration and not through class-action lawsuits. Courts have upheld these clauses under the idea that employers and employees mutually agree to the forum and all parties avoid the costly, time-consuming resolution provided by the courts. The downside to such clauses is that they prevent employees from bringing class-action lawsuits, which are more costly and time-consuming than a individual lawsuit, but can allow employees more opportunity to effectuate change.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that the FAA does interfere with employees’ rights [opinion, PDF] under the NLRA. Specifically, the court relied on sections 7 and 8 of the NLRA, which grant employees the right “to bargain collectively through representatives on their own choosing” and “engage in concerted activities,” such that it “shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise” of such rights. The Supreme Court will determine whether the FAA is enforceable given the provisions of the NLRA.

The second case, Sessions v. Dimaya [SCOTUSblog materials; transcript], seeks to determine the bounds of judicial review in immigration proceedings. This case concerns the Immigration and Nationality Act [text], which subjects immigrants convicted of “aggravated felonies” to mandatory removal. The parties dispute the definition of “aggravated felony” and whether Dimaya’s non-violent burglary convictions permit his deportation.

The government challenges the Ninth Circuit’s holding that the INA’s definition of “aggravated felony” was unconstitutionally vague [opinion, PDF]. It contends that challenges to immigration laws for vagueness in language are not appropriate for the courts, since the “Executive Branch possesses broad authority in the administration of the immigration laws because of their foreign relations and national security implications.” Courts have traditionally given the Executive Branch great deference in the enforcement of immigration laws, in part because immigration law concerns non-citizens in the United States. Thus, in determining the definition of “aggravated felony,” the Supreme Court must first determine its authority to render a decision on this immigration case, where the question concerns the interpretation of the statutory language.