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Legal news from Tuesday, November 6, 2012 |
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UN rights expert urges countries to combat online hate speech
Sarah Posner on November 6, 2012 10:42 AM ET

[JURIST] A UN independent expert on Monday urged countries to combat hate speech on the Internet [video], while simultaneously protecting freedom of speech. Special Rapporteur on Racism, Mutuma Ruteere told the General Assembly that an increase of hate websites inciting racial violence necessitates action. Ruteere called on governments, international bodies, private and public sector, and local communities to cooperate in developing a comprehensive approach to combating Internet hate speech [UN News Centre report]. Ruteere stressed that the comprehensive approach needed to incorporate a firm legal framework that does not infringe on free speech. Ruteree stated that:Any restrictions, control and censorship of the content disseminated via the Internet should be done on a clearly defined legal basis and in a manner that is necessary, proportionate and compatible with States' international human rights obligations including under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination. Ruteere urged states to educate their citizens about the problem with Internet hate speech and to promote tolerance.
Internet restrictions have been subject to international controversy. Last week a controversial Russian Internet regulation law which gives the Russian government the ability to completely block access to certain websites went into effect [JURIST report]. The bill's stated purpose is to block access to child pornography and the encouragement of drug use or suicide. In July the UN Human Rights Council [official website] passed its first-ever resolution [JURIST report] to protect the free speech of individuals online. The resolution was approved by all 47 members of the council, including China and Cuba, who have been criticized for limiting Internet freedom. The resolution was written to guarantee Internet freedom, including the free flow of information and freedom of expression.


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EU court strikes down Hungary law lowering retirement age for judges
Sarah Paulsworth on November 6, 2012 9:10 AM ET

[JURIST] The European Court of Justice (ECJ) [official website] on Tuesday struck down [judgment; press release, PDF] a Hungarian law [text, PDF] that lowered the mandatory retirement age for judges. Hungary's Law No LXVII of 1997 on the legal status and remuneration of judge was amended in 2011 to require all judges, prosecutors and notaries to retire at the age of 62 instead of 70 as was previously stipulated in the law. Hungary said the change in the retirement age was intended to redress positive discrimination in favor of those persons affected because, in contrast to other public sector employees, they could not only continue to work until the age of 70 but could also, in several cases, combine their salary with the retirement pension to which they were entitled from the time at which they reached retirement age. The European Commission [official website], however, argued that the Hungarian legislation at issue violated Article 2 of Directive 2000/78/EC [text] in that it gave rise to age-based discrimination between, on the one hand, judges, prosecutors and notaries who have reached the age-limit for retirement fixed by that legislation and, on the other hand, those persons who may continue to work. The ECJ said: The disputed national measures, pursuant to which the fact that a worker has reached the retirement age laid down by that legislation leads to automatic termination of his employment contract, must be regarded as directly imposing less favorable treatment of workers who have reached that age as compared with all other persons in the labor force. Such legislation therefore establishes a difference in treatment directly based on age. The ECJ went on to say that because the amended law on the retirement age of judges, prosecutors and notaries was not proportionate to the objectives Hungary was pursing Hungary failed to fulfil its obligations under Articles 2 and 6(1) of Directive 2000/78.
In 2007, the ECJ upheld [JURIST report] mandatory retirement ages in the EU, saying that mandatory retirement policies do not violate the prohibition against age discrimination if the policy is intended to further the legitimate public interest of increasing employment and the retirees are provided with full pensions. The EU prohibits discrimination on the grounds of sex, racial or ethnic origin, religion, disability, age, and sexual orientation. Directive 2000/78/EC is intended to implement the principle of equal treatment and eliminate inequalities within the EU, but does not prohibit national governments from instituting retirement ages.


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Ninth Circuit hears arguments on Arizona 20-week abortion ban
Julia Zebley on November 6, 2012 8:13 AM ET

[JURIST] The US Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit [official website] heard oral arguments [audio recording, WMA] Monday in Isaacson v. Horne [case materials] to consider a new Arizona abortion regulation [HB 2036 materials; JURIST report] that would ban abortions after 20 weeks unless there is a medical emergency. A group of doctors, represented by attorney Janet Crepps from the The Center for Reproductive Rights [advocacy website] opened the session by arguing that Planned Parenthood v. Casey and Gonzales v. Carhart [opinions] hold that "regardless of whether exceptions are made the State may not prohibit any woman from making the ultimate decision to terminate her pregnancy prior to viability. [The Supreme Court] described this rule as the central tenet of the abortion jurisprudence." Crepps also suggested, "There is no debate in the record: at 20 weeks, no fetus is viable. It's a government's intrusion into a woman's autonomy, and that is not acceptable." Defending the law, Maricopa County Attorney Bill Montgomery [official website] argued that the increasing risk of hemmorage to the woman after 20 weeks, and the Arizona legislature's findings of "fetal pain" allow the regulation. Montgomery also argued that the law does not ban abortions after 20 weeks, it merely regulates them. The law provides for abortions in the case of "medical emergency" but also has stipulations imposing misdeamanors against doctors who perform abortions after 20 weeks if that condition is not met. Oral arguments would indicate that the judges were unmoved by Montgomery's arguments, as they repeatedly suggested to him that the regulation does not meet the standards of Casey or Gonzales. Judge Kleinfeld, particularly, argued to both parties during arguments that a future child's pain is a health interest that the regulation should cover, allowing abortions past 20 weeks: "[S]ometimes you can't discover a birth defect until 20 weeks, and sometimes the fetus will be born with a horrible birth defect, which means it's born into hell, gets several months—or years—of operations and pain and then dies, as a baby." The Ninth Circuit enjoined [JURIST report] enforcement of the law in August.
This is the latest development in the ongoing reproductive rights controversy [JURIST backgrounder], and Arizona has had two abortion regulations tested in the courts. Late last month the US District Court for the District of Arizona enjoined Arizona [JURIST report] from implementing a public funding law [HB 2800, PDF] that prohibits funding for health clinics that perform abortions. A Texas court upheld a similar law, while the US Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit enjoined an Indiana [JURIST reports] law last month. In addition to Arizona, Alabama, Georgia, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Nebraska and Oklahoma [JURIST reports] have banned abortions in some form after 20-weeks.


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Supreme Court hears arguments on certifying class actions
Julia Zebley on November 6, 2012 7:04 AM ET

[JURIST] The US Supreme Court [official website] heard oral arguments [day call, PDF] in two cases Monday. In Comcast v. Behrend [transcript, PDF; JURIST report] the court heard arguments on how much judicial discretion is allowed when certifying a class for a class action lawsuit. In this case, the district court certified a class by judicial discretion, without resolving whether the plaintiff class had introduced admissible expert evidence, and the US Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed. The attorney for Comcast argued that although "abstract methodology, such as econometrics or regression analysis" might be used in the damages phase of a trial, it is too vague to use when certifying a class. The respondents argued that Comcast completely ignored the Daubert standard [opinion] for admissibility of expert evidence because it was inconvenient to its case. "The district judge has an obligation to serve as a gatekeeper whether there is a jury in the box or not. On a preliminary injunction, the court, if there is a proper Daubert objection, must make the objection at that time."
The Court also heard arguments in Amgen Inc. v. Connecticut Retirement Plans and Trust Funds [transcript, PDF; JURIST report] about whether, in a misrepresentation case under Securities and Exchange Commission Rule 10b-5 [text], the district court must require proof of materiality before certifying a plaintiff class based on the fraud-on-the-market theory and whether a defendant should be given the opportunity to rebut such presumption at the class certification stage. An attorney for Amgen Inc., a pharmaceutical company, argued that a false statement or misrepresentation is not an acceptable substitute for materiality. [E]very one of the four predicates to the fraud-on-the-market theory, which is a shortcut that—that excuses plaintiffs from proving that I heard the statement and relied on itevery one of those predicates is common. Whether the market is efficient is common. Whether the statement is public is common. Whether the stocks were bought and sold during the period of market distortion is common. And materiality is common. ... The falsity of the statement is common, but it is not a predicate to whether or not you can prove reliance on a statement indirectly by relying on the integrity of the market price, because in an efficient market, material public statements, whether they are true or false, will presumably move the market price. Respondents argued that, "Because materiality always generates a common answer for all class members, it is the quintessential common issue that does not splinter the class or cause it to be noncohesive for purposes of understanding predominance."


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