The scope of the federal government's power is much debated, but the fact that its powers are limited and enumerated is common ground to all. A judicial doctrine that implicitly or explicitly allows Congress to use the spending power without meaningful judicial supervision is simply not compatible with that basic premise of our system.

On Saturday, the federal government filed a brief [JURIST report] before the US Supreme Court arguing that the minimum coverage provision of the PPACA, which requires almost every US citizen to obtain health insurance by 2014 or face a tax penalty, is constitutional. The government is attempting to keep the focus of the argument on health care reform as a whole [SCOTUSblog report], rather than on the specific minimum coverage provision. The same group of 26 states filed a supporting brief arguing that the minimum coverage provision cannot be severed from the health care reform act without the entire system collapsing. The court granted certiorari to rule on health care reform law [JURIST report] in three separate cases, reserving five-and-half-hours for oral argument on the issue.

The members of a religious group put their faith in the hands of their ministers. Requiring a church to accept or retain an unwanted minister, or punishing a church for failing to do so, intrudes upon more than a mere employment decision. Such action interferes with the internal governance of the church, depriving the church of control over the selection of those who will personify its beliefs. By imposing an unwanted minister, the state infringes the Free Exercise Clause, which protects a religious group's right to shape its own faith and mission through its appointments.

Justice Clarence Thomas wrote separately to emphasize the deference courts must give to a "religious organization's good-faith understanding of who qualifies as its minister." The other justices implemented a fact-intensive analysis to determine whether the employee was a "minister" and therefore subject to the ministerial exception.

Currently 171 detainees [NYT docket] are held at Guantanamo. The Obama administration originally wanted suspected terrorists to be tried before a federal civilian court, but changed its position after Congress imposed a series of restrictions [JURIST reports] barring the transfer of Guantanamo detainees to the US, despite repeated appeals from rights groups to utilize civilian courts over military commissions. Last March, UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and counterterrorism Martin Scheinin [official website] called on the Obama administration to hold civilian trials [JURIST report] for Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and other suspected terrorists saying that the military commissions system is fatally flawed and cannot be reformed. Earlier that month, the ACLU released a full-page advertisement in the New York Times urging President Barack Obama [JURIST report] to uphold his pledge to try 9/11 suspects in civilian criminal court. That release came just days after White House advisers announced they were considering recommending [JURIST report] that Mohammed be tried in a military court rather than through the civilian criminal justice system. In an interview in 2010, Holder stated that the main goal of the administration is to hold the people responsible [JURIST report] for 9/11 accountable in the most effective way possible. Holder reiterated his support for holding the trials in civilian courts [JURIST report], saying that the criminal justice system has been proven an effective location for terrorism trials and that excluding civilian courts as a possible tool in fighting terrorism would ultimately weaken the nation's security. Holder announced in November 2009 that Mohammed would be tried in a civilian court [JURIST report] in Manhattan, drawing intense criticism and leading the Obama administration to reconsider the decision.

Similar immigration laws are being challenged throughout the US. In December a federal judge blocked [JURIST report] portions of the South Carolina law. Judge Richard Gergel blocked the provision that requires police to check immigration status, finding, "[t]his state-mandated scrutiny is without consideration of federal enforcement priorities and unquestionably vastly expands the persons targeted for immigration enforcement action. He also blocked the provision that outlaws harboring or transporting an illegal immigrant, finding a likelihood of irreparable harm. The law was set to take effect January 1. Also in December, Alabama and Georgia filed motions in the US Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit [official website] seeking to stay proceedings [JURIST report] on challenges to their immigration laws pending the Supreme Court ruling in Arizona v. United States. A challenge is also pending to an immigration law in Utah, and an Indiana law has been blocked [JURIST reports] by a federal judge.

Although the Ninth Circuit’s test may not be the easiest to administer, it best reflects the text of §1333(b), which establishes neither a situs-of-injury nor a "but for" test. We are confident that ALJs and courts will be able to determine whether an injured employee has established a significant causal link between the injury he suffered and his employer's on-OCS extractive operations. Although we expect that employees injured while performing tasks on the OCS will regularly satisfy the test, whether an employee injured while performing an off-OCS task qualifies—like Valladolid, who died while tasked with onshore scrap metal consolidation—is a question that will depend on the individual circumstances of each case.

Wednesday's ruling settles a split among the circuit courts. The court heard arguments [JURIST report] in the case in October. Pacific Operators Offshore argued that the OCSLA has no remedy for an injury that occurred on dry land, but rather Valladolid should have sought relief through state workers compensation law. The federal government argued that the OCSLA covers injuries or death on dry land explicitly, but not under the "nexus" reasoning the Ninth Circuit utilized. Valladolid's attorney argued that, pursuant to similar treatment in the Jones Act [text], his client's estate should be compensated for his death that occurred on land.

Rwanda has been continually scrutinized in relation to the 1994 genocide. In a report released in June of last year, Amnesty International (AI) [advocacy website] urged Rwanda to review laws it claims have a "genocide ideology" [JURIST report] that are being used to silence critics and dissenters. AI claims that Rwanda has broadly drafted hate speech laws passed since the 1994 genocide that are being used to criminalize legitimate criticism and expression that does not rise to the level of hate speech. In April 2010, Rwandan authorities arrested [JURIST report] opposition presidential candidate Victoire Ingabire Umuhoza [campaign website], accusing her of denying the 1994 genocide. The arrests come at a time when Kagame has received criticism from Human Rights Watch (HRW) [advocacy website] for his treatment of opposition parties. Last August, Peter Erlinder, former defense counsel at the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, argued [JURIST op-ed] that even though the White House has become more openly critical of Rwandan President Paul Kagame's regime, the US and international community at large must take a much closer look at those in power before true reconciliation will come to Rwanda.

Given the safeguards generally applicable in criminal trials, protections availed of by the defense in Perry's case, we hold that the introduction of Blandon's eyewitness testimony, without a preliminary judicial assessment of its reliability, did not render Perry’s trial fundamentally unfair.

Our cases thus establish a clear rule: The admission at trial of out-of-court eyewitness identifications derived from impermissibly suggestive circumstances that pose a very substantial likelihood of misidentification violates due process. The Court today announces that that rule does not even "com[e] into play" unless the suggestive circumstances are improperly "police-arranged."

The court heard arguments [JURIST report] in the case in November. The petitioner argued that it was fundamentally unfair to allow potentially erroneous eyewitness identifications into the trial simply because they were not orchestrated by police. New Hampshire, supported by the US Solicitor General as amicus curiae, argued that the rules of evidence provided sufficient safeguards and that cases where the erroneous identifications were disallowed were aimed at deterring police misconduct, which no one has alleged in the case at hand. In addition, the government urged it is the primary role of the jury to assess the reliability of evidence and handing that determination to the judge would be a fundamental shift in our trial practice. The court questioned whether the role of these due process protections was strictly deterrence or whether it also included prevention of injustice, as urged by petitioner.

The Court's decision in Casey accented the state's interest in potential life, holding that its earlier decisions following Roe failed to give this interest force at all stages of a pregnancy and that in service of this interest the state may insist that a woman be made aware of the development of the fetus at her stage of pregnancy. Significantly, the Court held that the fact that such truthful, accurate information may cause a woman to choose not to abort her pregnancy only reinforces its relevance to an informed decision. Insisting that a doctor give this information in his traditional role of securing informed consent is permissible. Texas has done just this and affords three exceptions to its required delivery of information about the stage of fetal growth where in its judgment the information had less relevance, a legislative judgment that is at least rational.

Texas Governor Rick Perry [official website] signed the measure into law in May, but it was blocked in August by a federal judge after a challenge [JURIST reports] from the CRR. Both Oklahoma and North Carolina have enacted similar laws. A federal judge granted a preliminary injunction [JURIST report] against the North Carolina in October. With the sonogram portion temporarily removed, the rest of the North Carolina law went into force. Oklahoma's law has also been blocked [JURIST report].

And as we sit here today, literally facing thousands and thousands of ginned-up computer-generated complaints that are holding up literally hundreds of TV license renewals, so that the whole system has come to a screeching halt because of the difficulty of trying to resolve these issues. So to say that the system is working well seems to me, at least from the broadcasters' perspective, is to suggest that's just not true.

In Knox v. Service Employees International Union, Local 1000 (SEIU) [transcript, PDF; JURIST report], the court heard arguments on whether the First and Fourteenth Amendments [text] allow a state to compel non-union members to pay into union funds that are being used for political advocacy that they disagree with, thus making support of that political stance a condition for employment. There is also a question as to whether notice that this is a condition of employment makes the condition sufficient. However, between the time certiorari was granted and oral arguments, SEIU had decided that they were not going to defend the case further and would argue mootness, due to the original officers of the union no longer holding those positions and that the union has created a new procedure to address the issue at hand. The plaintiffs argued that the court should still rule on the financial award at stake.

We have observed that evidence impeaching an eyewitness may not be material if the State's testimony was the only evidence linking Smith to the crime. And Boatner's undisclosed statements directly contradict his testimony: Boatner told the jury that he had "[n]o doubt" that Smith was the gunman he stood "face to face" with on the night of the crime, but [the police detective's] notes show Boatner saying that he "could not ID anyone because [he] couldn't see faces" and "would not know them if [he] saw them." Boatner's undisclosed statements were plainly material.

Smith v. Cain is only the latest of several allegations of prosecutorial misconduct [SCOTUSblog backgrounder] out of the New Orleans District Attorney's office. This scrutiny has been ongoing for 15 years, beginning with Kyles v. Whitley [text], as the New Orleans District Attorney's office continues a policy of withholding exculpatory evidence from the defense. Last term, a divided court ruled in Connick v. Thompson [JURIST report] that District Attorney Harry Connick Sr.'s failure to train subordinates in properly handling evidence could not result in a civil suit. As in Smith v. Cain, Thompson was convicted due to Connick's office not releasing exculpatory evidence to the defense.