Mutual recognition key to overcoming Yugoslav Wars Commentary
Mutual recognition key to overcoming Yugoslav Wars
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Ian Bancroft [Co-founder & Executive Director, TransConflict]: “What was truly significant about the recent events in the eastern Croatian town of Vukovar was the willingness of both presidents – Serbia’s Boris Tadić and Croatia’s Ivo Josipović – to apologize for crimes committed by the military forces of their respective countries; Tadić for the massacre of 260 Croats in 1991, Josipović for the killing of 18 Serbs in the village of Paulin Dvor later that same year. Mutual recognition is a key, yet contentious element of the process of reconciliation. It does not imply the equalisation of the severity of the crimes committed, nor does it in any way serve to diminish culpability for those very crimes. Instead, it reaffirms the sanctity of each and every individual victim of the war, irrespective of their ethnicity.

There exists, however, a fine line between recognising and relativising war crimes. One party to the conflict – which is invariably defined in terms of ethno-national identity – refuses to acknowledge crimes committed against another party because of a sense that, in doing so, they will somehow justify the very crimes perpetuated against them by that same party. The problem is compounded by the overly simplistic dichotomies employed in an effort to explain the civil war in the former Yugoslavia – for instance, the notion of “defenders” versus “aggressors” – which tend to reinforce the collectivisation of guilt and prevent an ethnicity-blind pursuit of justice for individual victims.

The continued instrumentalisation of war crimes for political purposes – particularly in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo – further impairs the prospects for reconciliation, at least in the foreseeable future. With unresolved status issues – namely, Bosnia’s internal governing structure and Kosovo’s secession from Serbia – ever present in the political life of each territory, leaders on all sides are reluctant to take the first step towards apology and forgiveness for fear of giving credence to their opponent’s stance. Narratives of victimhood also distract attention from the real reasons for the lack of progress and serve to erroneously attribute blame to others.

The domestic criticisms that both presidents have encountered for their apologies – particularly following the Serbian parliament’s resolution in March this year condemning the 1995 Srebrenica massacre and Josipović’s address to members of both houses of Bosnia’s parliament where he expressed his deep regret about Croatia’s own role – raises another important question; namely, can acts of forgiveness or apology be made on behalf of entire ethno-national groups when many members of a “group” or “community” do not seek forgiveness nor to apologize, or when members of another do not wish to forgive? To ensure that the apologies made reverberate throughout both Serbian and Croatian society, there is a need to continue to support efforts at public education and debate. A failure to do will mean that the courageous acts of Tadić and Josipović remain largely in the domain of high symbolism.

With respect to Serbian-Croatian relations, a number of outstanding issues left over from the war remain to be solved, particularly the fate of missing persons. In addition, both countries are striving to reach an amicable out of court settlement to their respective genocide cases against one another (Croatia’s back in 1999 and Serbia’s counter-suit earlier this year). Serbia’s genuine commitment to dealing with the legacies of the past will, however, only be confirmed by determined steps to apprehend and extradite Ratko Mladić.

Only through the mutual recognition of each and every victim of the wars of the former Yugoslavia, regardless of their identity, can the foundations be laid to help transcend hardening inter-ethnic divisions. The transformation of conflict in the region requires both an end to the collectivisation of guilt and the instrumentalisation of crimes for political ends. Overcoming these conundrums, however, requires a sustained public debate – founded upon mutual recognition and acknowledgement – that involves those often neglected and maligned voices. Whether the political will exists for such a process, however, especially in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, remains to be seen.”


This article was prepared for publication by Yuriy Vilner, an associate editor for JURIST’s professional commentary service. Please direct any questions or comments to him at professionalcommentary@jurist.org


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