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    <title>JURIST - Forum</title>
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    <description>Op-eds on legal news by law professors and JURIST special guests</description>
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            <title>Stuttering Law: A Manifesto on Play, Interpretation, and Artificial Intelligence</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/06/stuttering-law-a-manifesto-on-play-interpretation-and-artificial-intelligence/</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 17 Jun 2026 23:24:33 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>AmirAli Maleki</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109663</guid>
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            <content:encoded><![CDATA[I still remember the children in the courtyard of our apartment building. There were only two boys among a larger group of girls, and yet one of the most serious negotiations of their small world revolved around a strangely precise question: who would play the husband. What appeared, from the distance of adulthood, as a trivial or even absurd game was in fact the construction of a miniature normative universe. Roles were not simply chosen; they were argued over, redistributed, justified, contested, and occasionally imposed. The children did not merely imitate a social order that already existed outside them; they generated one in real time, with a seriousness that did not depend on adult recognition in order to be binding within its own horizon.

What is striking in retrospect is not the content of their imagination, but the structural logic of it. The game was not a space of arbitrary freedom, but a space of emergent constraint. A disagreement would immediately require a rule; a rule would require interpretation; interpretation would create asymmetries; asymmetries would demand correction; and correction would open the possibility of a new rule. In this sense, their play was already a primitive jurisprudence: not in the sense that it resembled law superficially, but in the sense that it reproduced law’s most fundamental temporal structure, namely the continuous production of normativity through situated interpretation.

Years later, I encountered philosophical descriptions of play that suddenly illuminated this memory in a different light. In particular, the hermeneutic tradition associated with Hans-Georg Gadamer - In “The Relevance of the Beautiful” (1974 - Die Aktualität des Schönen) - articulates play not as an activity governed by a sovereign subject, but as an event that exceeds the intentional control of its participants. In play, the subject is not simply the origin of action; rather, the subject is drawn into a movement that has its own logic, its own rhythm, its own insistence. One does not simply play a game; one is played by the game. This formulation is not metaphorical decoration but a reversal of agency. It displaces the modern assumption that meaning originates in a fully self-transparent subject and instead suggests that meaning emerges in the middle of a process that cannot be fully possessed by any participant. If we take this seriously, then play is not a domain opposed to seriousness, but a form of seriousness that does not depend on subjective sovereignty.

It is precisely here that law begins to reveal its deeper affinity with play. Legal order is often described as a system of rules applied by authoritative subjects to determinate cases, but this description misses the performative and temporal dimension of legal meaning. Law does not exist as a static structure waiting to be applied; it exists as a sequence of interpretive acts in which meaning is continuously stabilized and destabilized at the same time. Each application of a rule is simultaneously an interpretation of its past and a transformation of its future. Precedent, in this sense, is not a repository of answers but a memory that only becomes meaningful through repetition under new conditions.

Judicial practice therefore cannot be reduced to the mechanical application of norms. It is better understood as participation in an ongoing interpretive event in which the meaning of norms is never fully exhausted. What a precedent “is” cannot be separated from what it becomes through its use. This means that legal reasoning is not located outside the law, as a neutral technique applied to it, but inside the movement through which law constitutes itself as meaningful. The courtroom is not the place where law ends in decision; it is the place where law continues in a different form.

Once this is acknowledged, law appears less as a hierarchical system of commands and more as a structured field of play. This does not mean that law is arbitrary or aesthetic in a superficial sense. On the contrary, it means that law is structured precisely through its capacity to generate constraints that are not externally imposed but internally produced through interpretation. A legal argument is not simply evaluated against a fixed rule; it participates in the ongoing determination of what the rule is taken to mean. In this sense, legal interpretation is not secondary to law; it is constitutive of law.

At this point, the question of artificial intelligence enters not as an external disruption but as an internal intensification of an already existing structure. Artificial intelligence is often introduced into legal discourse as a tool for efficiency: for retrieving precedents, predicting outcomes, or assisting decision-making. Yet such a framing remains too limited, because it treats AI as an external instrument applied to a pre-given field of meaning. What is increasingly evident, however, is that AI systems do not merely retrieve legal meaning; they actively reorganize the field in which legal meaning becomes legible. They structure similarity, suggest analogy, cluster precedent, and generate patterns of relevance that influence how arguments are formed before they ever reach the level of explicit articulation. This means that artificial intelligence is not simply outside interpretation, assisting it from a distance. It is already embedded within the interpretive field, shaping its conditions of possibility.

Once legal information is mediated through algorithmic systems, the question is no longer whether interpretation remains human, but how human interpretation is transformed by its entanglement with computational forms of reasoning. The distinction between tool and participant becomes unstable, not because machines become human, but because interpretation itself was never purely human in the first place.

To recognize this is not to anthropomorphize technology or to grant it juridical authority. It is to acknowledge that interpretation has always depended on mediating structures: language, institutions, archives, traditions. Artificial intelligence is a new configuration of such mediation, one that operates at a different scale and speed, and with a different capacity to produce patterns that appear as meaningful before they are consciously interpreted. In this sense, AI does not replace interpretation; it reorganizes its temporal and epistemic conditions.

From this transformation emerges what can be called the principle of artificial interpretation. This principle does not assert that machines interpret law in the same way humans do, nor does it reduce legal reasoning to computation. Rather, it names a condition in which legal interpretation is no longer exclusively located within human subjectivity but distributed across a hybrid field of human and non-human operations. Interpretation becomes an event produced through the interaction of judicial reasoning, institutional memory, textual traditions, and algorithmic structuring. Meaning is no longer the property of a subject; it is the effect of a field.

This shift has profound consequences for how we understand responsibility, authority, and legitimacy in law. If interpretation is distributed, then responsibility cannot be assigned to a single locus without remainder. The judge remains responsible in an institutional sense, but the conditions under which a judgment becomes possible are no longer fully transparent to the judge’s own perspective. They are shaped by infrastructures of information processing that influence what counts as relevant, comparable, or foreseeable. This does not dissolve responsibility, but complicates it. It demands a more reflexive understanding of legal authority, one that acknowledges the opacity of the interpretive field without surrendering to it.

In this expanded field, judicial activity can no longer be understood as the application of stable norms to fixed facts. It becomes participation in a dynamic process of meaning production in which each decision is simultaneously backward-looking and forward-generating. A judgment interprets precedent, but it also reconfigures the conditions under which future precedents will be read. The temporality of law is therefore not linear but recursive: each moment of decision folds the past into the future and the future back into the present.

Artificial intelligence intensifies this recursion. By accelerating the circulation of precedents, generating probabilistic predictions, and producing dense networks of similarity across large legal corpora, AI compresses interpretive time. It creates a situation in which the future is continuously anticipated within the present, and the present is saturated with algorithmically generated projections of possible outcomes. Law becomes not only reactive but anticipatory in a systematic way, and this anticipation is no longer purely human but computationally mediated.

In such a context, resistance to AI as a purely external threat to legal purity misses the point. The more relevant question is how participation in this transformed field can be made reflective rather than unconscious. Refusing engagement does not restore a pre-technological purity of law; it merely obscures the extent to which legal interpretation is already structurally mediated. What is required instead is an attitude of critical participation, one that neither fetishizes computation nor denies its role in shaping legal meaning.

This leads to a deeper transformation in the concept of jurisprudence itself. Jurisprudence can no longer be understood as a discipline that stands outside law in order to describe or systematize it. It must be understood as a reflexive practice that is itself part of the interpretive game it seeks to analyze. Legal theory becomes a move within the game of law, not an external commentary upon it. It introduces distinctions, concepts, and frameworks that alter the field of possible interpretations. Theory is therefore not neutral; it is performative. In this sense, a contemporary jurisprudence must become aware of its own implication in the structures it describes. It must recognize that to speak about law is already to intervene in law’s mode of self-understanding. This is particularly important in the age of artificial intelligence, where conceptual distinctions between interpretation, computation, and prediction are constantly being renegotiated. A jurisprudence that ignores these transformations risks becoming anachronistic, describing a legal world that no longer exists.

What then remains of law in this condition of distributed interpretation and algorithmic mediation? Not its dissolution, but its transformation into a more explicitly processual and relational form. Law becomes less a system of fixed norms and more a continuous practice of negotiation over meaning under conditions that are never fully controllable. Its stability is no longer grounded in permanence but in repetition. Its authority is no longer grounded in transcendence but in participation.

Returning, finally, to the courtyard of childhood play, one can now see that what was unfolding there was not merely imitation but a rudimentary form of this very structure. The children were not outside law; they were already inside its logic of emergent normativity. They were not simply playing roles; they were producing a world in which roles had to be justified, contested, and re-established. Their play was not a suspension of seriousness but its earliest form. In the same way, contemporary law cannot be understood as something that stands above play, supervising it from a position of final authority. It is itself a form of play in Gadamer’s sense: an event that exceeds the intentions of its participants while requiring their continuous involvement. Artificial intelligence does not interrupt this play; it enters it. And once it enters, the structure of the game changes, not by replacing its rules with external commands, but by altering the conditions under which rules are generated, interpreted, and transformed.

There is therefore no position outside the game from which law, interpretation, or technology can be finally surveyed. There is only participation within a field that is constantly reconstituting itself through its own movements. To think law today is to think this condition without nostalgia for stability and without illusion about control. It is to recognize that interpretation is not something we do after law exists, but the very mode in which law continues to exist at all. And in the age of artificial interpretation, this mode becomes irreversibly distributed, recursive, and technologically entangled.

We are not witnessing the end of interpretation. We are witnessing its expansion into a field that includes us, exceeds us, and yet still requires us to continue playing. The game does not end. It only changes its players, its rules, and the way it is played.

Artificial intelligence enters this field not as an external authority and not even merely as a new participant, but as a peculiar kind of linguistic operator: a system that gathers dispersed human discourses, fragments them, and reproduces them in a stuttering, recombinatory form that does not belong fully to any single speaker yet carries traces of all of them. In this sense, AI does not introduce a new language outside interpretation; it reorganizes the already existing languages of interpretation by re-staging them in altered configurations. It collects judicial reasoning, doctrinal distinctions, moral vocabularies, and everyday linguistic intuitions, and re-injects them into the interpretive field as hybrid expressions that are neither original nor derivative in a classical sense. What appears as coherence is in fact a controlled instability, a repetition-with-difference that forces interpretation to confront its own multiplicity.

To engage with AI, therefore, is not to use a tool, but to enter into a dialogue with a language that stutters the human back to itself. It is a language that does not resolve disagreement but multiplies its forms, does not eliminate ambiguity but redistributes it across new surfaces of articulation. In doing so, it intensifies the juridical condition of interpretation: we are no longer simply interpreting texts, but interpreting the very recombination of interpretive traditions that AI continuously performs. The game, then, does not end. It becomes denser, more recursive, and more visibly artificial in its own constitution. And precisely in this artificiality, interpretation reveals itself not as something threatened by machines, but as something that has always already been a process of mediated, collective, and unstable production of meaning.



AmirAli Maleki is a researcher specializing in international law and the philosophy of law, and the Editor of PraxisPublication.com. He works in the fields of political philosophy, Islamic philosophy, and hermeneutics. He is the recipient of JURIST’s 2026 David M. Crane Rule of Law award.


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            <item>
            <title>Iran&#8217;s World Cup Team in Tijuana Shows How Borders, Not Bans, Now Define Sovereignty</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/06/irans-world-cup-team-in-tijuana-shows-how-borders-not-bans-now-fefine-sovereignty/</link>
            <pubDate>Thu, 11 Jun 2026 23:47:16 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>AmirAli Maleki</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109658</guid>
            <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[I am not particularly interested in football, which is perhaps precisely why it began to interest me as something other than football, since there are subjects that announce themselves through passion, through expertise, through a prior attachment that legitimizes one’s engagement with them as if understanding could only follow from caring, and there are others that arrive in a more disturbing way through indifference interrupted, through the sudden pressure of a detail that refuses to remain merely anecdotal and instead begins to organize thought around itself without asking permission, while concepts, at least the stubborn ones, rarely respect disciplinary boundaries and do not wait for authorization from jurisprudence, political theory, or international law, but instead emerge in places where theory is absent although structure is already quietly operating, fully formed but not yet recognized as such, as if reality occasionally precedes the language required to describe it and forces us to construct retroactively the conceptual tools we did not know we needed.

The idea that concerns this essay emerged in such a moment that had nothing of theoretical intention in it at the time and only later revealed itself as structurally dense, since it did not come from a text, nor from a lecture, nor from any established problem in legal or political theory, but from a small café after the war at a time when ordinary life had only recently returned and still carried the fragile temporality of something provisional, as if everyday routines had not yet fully decided whether they were permanent or merely paused and could be withdrawn again without warning, while during the war we rarely sat still in cafés and instead walked continuously, not because walking solved anything but because it created a minimal illusion of agency, a sense that movement might still matter in a world where almost nothing else did, even though we knew rationally that this belief was false and that any street could have been exposed, any building could have been implicated, and we ourselves were not outside the condition we tried to escape but were only reorganizing our relation to it through motion that disguised exposure as choice.

When the war receded into a less immediate form of memory and the city slowly reassembled its ordinary rhythms, we returned to sitting down, to coffee, to conversations that no longer needed to be interrupted by the possibility of sirens, and it was during one of these afternoons that my friend mentioned, almost without emphasis and as if it were merely logistical information, that Iran’s national football team would be based in Tijuana during the 2026 World Cup and would enter the United States only for matches because of visa constraints, security concerns, and the accumulated friction of political relations that had gradually been translated into administrative procedures, and I remember responding without much reflection in a tone that mixed irony with fatigue that this was simply how things now appeared everywhere, that individuals were increasingly encountered not as individuals but as extensions of political identities, that “Iranian” had become an administrative category of suspicion as if 90 million people could be compressed into a single geopolitical file, and I even added something about his cat potentially being sanctioned by American cats, a joke that only made sense in the fragile atmosphere of postwar conversation where humor functions less as entertainment than as a delay mechanism for seriousness that has not yet found its conceptual form, while the conversation itself eventually moved on toward safer topics but the arrangement it revealed did not leave me.

What remained was not the football tournament as such but the structure it revealed without intending to reveal anything at all, namely the fact that a national team could be neither excluded nor fully included, neither banned nor normalized, but instead placed into a spatial and administrative configuration that required it to inhabit one territory while performing in another, and this arrangement suggested that something more than sport was taking place, something that cannot be adequately described within the vocabulary of sport alone because it involves the organization of movement, delay, permission, and conditional presence as mechanisms through which political identity is not merely represented but continuously produced and regulated, and it is at this point that the concept of a “legal phenomenon” becomes necessary, not as metaphor and not as rhetorical extension, but as an attempt to name a specific mode in which law operates when it is no longer confined to its institutional self-description and instead appears through the ordinary infrastructures that govern how bodies circulate in space.

A legal phenomenon, in the sense I want to propose here, is not simply anything regulated by law and it is not merely a social object affected by legal rules, but rather a socially embedded configuration that simultaneously produces normative meaning, mediates between individual life and sovereign structure, and renders sovereignty visible within the texture of everyday experience, and this definition is deliberately restrictive because it is meant to avoid the inflation of law into everything social while still acknowledging that law does not remain contained within institutions but continuously exceeds them through its embedding in practices that are not themselves explicitly juridical but nevertheless reproduce juridical effects, and a legal phenomenon therefore names the point at which law becomes experientially legible without announcing itself as law, where sovereignty ceases to appear as an abstract principle and instead becomes a perceptible arrangement of space, movement, and recognition that can be encountered in lived reality rather than only in doctrinal abstraction.

This understanding becomes clearer if we situate it in relation to socio-legal traditions that have long attempted to displace the reduction of law to formal institutions, from Ehrlich’s notion of living law to Bourdieu’s analysis of the juridical field and especially Robert Cover’s insistence that law exists within narrative worlds that give normative structure to social meaning, yet even these approaches remain insufficient if we do not extend them toward the recognition that contemporary sovereignty is increasingly spatialized rather than merely narrated or interpreted, meaning that law today operates not only through texts and decisions but through infrastructures that organize circulation, filter access, and distribute the conditions under which presence becomes possible, reversible, or suspended, and in this sense legal phenomena are not secondary effects of law but the primary sites where law becomes visible as a lived condition rather than an abstract system.

From this perspective international football is not a marginal cultural field in relation to law but one of its most condensed and intensified sites of visibility because the global structure of football does not merely reflect the existence of states but actively produces a representational order in which sovereignty, population, and identity are translated into legible forms that can circulate under conditions of strict regulation, and national teams therefore function not simply as teams but as temporary condensations of political belonging that must appear unified within a system that is itself built on administrative differentiation, where flags, anthems, eligibility rules, travel regimes, and border controls are not decorative elements but juridical technologies that make political identity operable within a global space that is structured through uneven regimes of mobility and recognition.

The situation of the Iranian national team therefore becomes intelligible not as an anomaly but as a clarification of this structure because it shows how sovereignty today often operates not primarily through simple exclusion but through differentiated inclusion in which participation is maintained while being reorganized spatially and administratively, such that the team is not removed from the global order but redistributed within it, allowed to exist but under conditions that require continuous negotiation of movement across borders that are not neutral lines but active filters of political suspicion, and this condition of being neither fully inside nor fully outside but suspended in managed mobility reveals that sovereignty is no longer only the power to exclude but also the power to modulate degrees of access, proximity, and circulation across global space.

What appears here as logistical organization is in fact part of a broader legal logic in which global mobility is structured through asymmetries of trust, since visa regimes, security classifications, and border infrastructures operate not merely as administrative mechanisms but as systems that translate political identities into differential possibilities of movement, and football becomes particularly revealing in this context precisely because it condenses these dispersed infrastructures into a visible and emotionally charged form where the abstract logic of global governance becomes embodied in the movement of teams, the routing of bodies, and the conditional permeability of borders that are constantly being crossed but never fully dissolved.

Yet this visibility is never politically neutral because it always produces a distribution of recognition and suspicion in which national teams are read as extensions of state authority and thereby create a symbolic compression that renders entire populations legible through institutional representation, while at the same time the opposite position, which insists on a strict separation between people and state, fails to account for the structural entanglement through which international recognition actually operates, and the more adequate description is therefore neither identity nor separation but asymmetrical interdependence in which populations are never fully reducible to states yet never fully external to the structures through which states are globally recognized and made intelligible.

One way to describe this condition is through what might be called political stuttering, where states speak in the language of coherence, continuity, and administrative fluency while societies rarely speak in unified form and instead appear as fragmented, contradictory, and internally plural expressions that resist closure, and this stuttering is not a defect but a constitutive feature of political life because it prevents the totalization of representation under a single voice, and football stages this tension in intensified form by requiring national teams to perform unity while being composed of internal difference, to embody coherence while being constituted by plurality, and to represent singular identity while being structured by heterogeneous social realities that cannot be fully harmonized but must nevertheless appear as one body within the representational frame of international competition.

The Iranian case sharpens this dynamic further because it reveals the spatial cost of representation in which participation is maintained only through redistribution across territories and infrastructures that reorganize movement itself as a political problem, and what looks like a tournament arrangement becomes in fact a choreography of sovereignty in which presence is continuously negotiated through spatial segmentation, and in this sense the legal phenomenon does not simply reflect law but makes law perceptible as a condition of lived experience where sovereignty is encountered not as abstraction but as the organization of everyday mobility. If there is a conclusion to be drawn, it is not that football secretly governs political life or that sport is merely a disguised form of law, but rather that law increasingly operates through arrangements that are not immediately recognizable as legal while nevertheless structuring the most ordinary conditions of global existence, and legal phenomena are precisely those moments in which this distributed sovereignty becomes visible without being formally declared, where what governs life does not appear as doctrine but as movement, delay, access, and the uneven permeability of space that shapes how global life is both connected and unequally experienced.

I find myself returning again and again to that afternoon in the café not because of football itself or the logistics of the tournament but because of how quickly an apparently trivial remark opened onto a structure that was already in place and operating long before it was noticed, and I remember the joke about the cat more clearly than any administrative detail because at the time it felt like a way of avoiding seriousness but now appears as part of the same structure, a small displacement within a larger system of displacements through which contemporary sovereignty becomes visible to those who live within its everyday arrangements without necessarily having the concepts to name what they are seeing, and the cat, in the end, recovered, but the conceptual disturbance did not disappear because it did not belong to an exceptional moment but to an ordinary architecture in which law does not remain confined to institutions but circulates through the infrastructures of movement and recognition that organize global life as a field of uneven visibility, and it is precisely in this ordinariness that legal phenomena reveal themselves most clearly, not as extraordinary events but as the subtle condition under which presence in the world becomes both possible and politically differentiated.


AmirAli Maleki is a researcher specializing in international law and the philosophy of law, and the Editor of PraxisPublication.com. He works in the fields of political philosophy, Islamic philosophy, and hermeneutics. He is the recipient of JURIST’s 2026 David M. Crane Rule of Law award.

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            <title>After Pope Leo&#8217;s Slavery Apology, the Harder Reckoning Begins</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/06/after-pope-leos-slavery-apology-the-harder-reckoning-begins/</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 17:14:05 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>Cecilia Akoko Attiogbe Atayi | U. Cape Coast Faculty of Law</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109645</guid>
            <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Pope Leo has issued what observers are calling the most direct papal acknowledgment yet of the Catholic Church's historic role in legitimizing slavery, buried within a sweeping new encyclical on artificial intelligence and human dignity. In Magnifica Humanitas, a wide-ranging encyclical primarily addressing artificial intelligence and Catholic social doctrine, Pope Leo acknowledged both the Church's delay in condemning the practice of slavery and its historic involvement in legitimizing it. He wrote that it is "impossible not to feel deep sorrow when contemplating the immense suffering and humiliation." This "sincere" pardon is not merely a symbolic gesture; it represents a profound moment of moral reckoning for one of the world's most influential religious institutions. The Catholic Church, with its centuries-long history of shaping moral, social, and political norms, cannot escape scrutiny for its role in one of humanity's gravest injustices.

This commentary explores the historical context of the Church's involvement in slavery, the significance of Pope Leo's apology, the way forward beyond apology, and the broader implications.

The Church and slavery

The most shocking evidence of complicity lies in the papal decrees of the 15th and 16th centuries. Referred to as the Papal Bulls, decrees such as Dum Diversas (1452) and Romanus Pontifex (1455) authorized Christian rulers to conquer non-Christian lands and enslave their inhabitants. These decrees provided theological justification for European colonial expansion and the transatlantic slave trade. In effect, the Church sanctified practices that led to the mass enslavement of Africans and indigenous people, embedding slavery within the moral framework of Christendom.

Although voices within the Church, including Bartolomé de las Casas, condemned the brutality of slavery, the Church's condemnation came late. It was not until the 19th century that the Church began to issue stronger statements against slavery, long after abolitionist movements had gained traction in secular societies. Pope Leo's acknowledgement of the delay is an admission of moral failure as the Church lagged behind in defending one of the most fundamental human rights - freedom.

The significance of the apology

Pope Leo's apology is significant for several reasons for me as a staunch African Catholic and other Africans. By admitting fault, the Church as a human institution confronts its complicity in a system that inflicted immense suffering. This is a recognition that the Church's teachings and authority were used to legitimize oppression.

The apology situates the Church within the broader narrative of slavery, acknowledging its role rather than distancing itself from history. This honesty is crucial for credibility, as denial or minimization would only deepen the public's mistrust in God's Church. By addressing past wrongs, the Church strengthens its moral authority in the present. A faith community that refuses to confront its sins risks hypocrisy and irrelevance.

The way forward beyond apology


While Pope Leo's apology is commendable, it raises pressing questions about the adequacy of acknowledgement without action. Apologies though necessary are not sufficient if not accompanied by concrete measures.

The Church must consider whether reparations are appropriate. This could take the form of financial support for communities historically disadvantaged by slavery, investment in education, or initiatives that address systemic inequalities. Without tangible commitments, the apology risks being symbolic rather than transformative.

Additionally, the Church also has a responsibility to ensure that its history with slavery is taught honestly within Catholic institutions. This includes seminaries, schools, and universities. By confronting its past openly, the Church can foster critical reflection among future generations of clergy and the lay faithful.

Slavery was not confined to Europe; its effects were global, particularly in Africa and America. The Church must therefore engage with communities across affected continents, listening to their experiences and tailoring its reconciliation efforts to diverse contexts. A universal apology must be matched by localized actions.

The Church must reflect on how its doctrine was used to justify slavery. This requires revisiting doctrines of human dignity, freedom, and salvation, ensuring that they are articulated in ways that resist oppression rather than enable it.

Pope Leo's apology should spark deeper theological renewal. This leaves me with the question, could reparative justice bring about neocolonialism?

The broader implications 

The Catholic Church's apology adds weight to this movement, reminding the world that institutions must confront their histories with all honesty. The apology has implications for contemporary issues of human rights. All forms of slavery must be abolished, modern forms of exploitation; human trafficking, forced labour, and systemic racism still persists. By being remorseful about her past, the Church also positions itself to speak more credibly on present day injustices. The apology is not only about history; it's about shaping a moral vision for the future.

Talking of concrete measures, three days after the Pope's apology, the French National Assembly in a 254-0 decision voted to repeal the Code Noir, a 1685 decree issued under King Louis XIV that regulated slavery in France's colonies.  The Code Noir classified enslaved Africans as property, stripped us of legal personhood, codified racial hierarchy into law. Although slavery itself was abolished in France in 1848, the Code Noir — enacted in 1685 — remained on the books for nearly two centuries. Its repeal is therefore symbolic as the law had long ceased to have legal force yet its presence was a reminder of France's colonial complicity in slavery and racial discrimination.

Just as the Church's condemnation of slavery came late after abolitionist movements had already reshaped moral consciousness, France's repeal of Code Noir arrived long after slavery had ended. In both cases, institutions acknowledged their failures belatedly. At the same time, both actions carry undeniable significance reason being that they reshape collective memory and signal institutional willingness to confront uncomfortable truths.

Conclusion

Pope Leo's apology represents a watershed moment in the Catholic Church's confrontation with its past. By admitting both delay and complicity, the Church has taken a necessary step toward moral clarity. Yet, the true meaning of this apology would lie in its aftermath. Whether it inspires meaningful actions that honours the memory of those who suffered under slavery and advances the cause of human dignity today.

The Church's credibility depends not only on its ability to preach justice but also on its willingness to embody it. Pope Leo's words must therefore be the beginning, not the end, of a journey toward reconciliation. I opine that if the Church can translate apology into action, it may redeem its moral authority and contribute to healing the wounds of slavery.

In the end, the apology is both a confession and a call to action. It reminds us that institutions just like humans, must confront their sins in order to move forward. For the Catholic Church, this moment is an opportunity to show that faith is not only about words but deeds, deeds that affirm the dignity of every human being, past, present, and future. For Africa, we have arrived to demand what was taken from us.

Cecilia Akoko Attiogbe Atayi is a JURIST staff writer and a recent law graduate of the University Cape Coast Faculty of Law.]]></content:encoded>
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            <title>Beyond &#8216;America First&#8217;: International Law and the Obligation of Global Unity</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/06/beyond-america-first-international-law-and-the-obligation-of-global-unity/</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 10 Jun 2026 16:44:40 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>Louis Rene Beres</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109644</guid>
            <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[During the 1960s, the author spent four years studying international law at Princeton. At that time, the intellectual influence of J. Robert Oppenheimer and Albert Einstein was palpable on campus. Much of the earliest conceptual thought about nuclear weapons and nuclear war originated at Princeton. Here, Professor Beres examines what we can learn from these two atomic physicists, not about “The Bomb” or its technical/operational aspects, but variously correlative obligations to forge global unity.[1] Though such obligations will be dismissed out-of-hand by “realists,” nothing could be more utopian than staying the precarious course of belligerent nationalism. From its jurisprudential beginnings at the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, this species-defiling course (i.e., an “everyone for himself” system of world politics) has spawned war,[2] terrorism and genocide.[3] 
“The visionary is the only realist.”

Federico Fellini
To begin, certain core questions have to be asked. Why do we humans cling tenaciously to a persistently discredited dynamic of international relations? Why has this conspicuously failed dynamic managed to remain the determinative order of “Westphalian” diplomacy?[4] Until our leaders can finally answer this basic question satisfactorily, there will be no durable respite from the unceasing horrors of belligerent world politics.[5]

Additional questions should also be raised. Scholars will need to inquire: Why are there still no tangible movements to build upon the human unity that lies latent in us all?[6] Why has there been so little evident dissatisfaction with worldwide anarchy[7] and a steadily-encroaching global chaos.[8] Are we humans a self-destroying "mass,"[9] an inert species destined for recurrent bloodshed and inevitable extinction? Or do we harbor a residual capacity for civilizational growth and survival?[10]

Regarding such core questions, there seems little cause for optimism. Though few people on earth can reasonably expect their leaders to resemble Plato's "philosopher king,"[11] others ought at least  be able to choose from among capable politicians who would offer more than incessant delusion. This means, inter alia, national leaders who can meaningfully apprehend the interrelated benefits of philosophy, culture, literature, law and science.

The Lasting Debilities of “America First”

From the beginning of his first administration, President Donald Trump's rancorous ideology of "America First"—the reductio ad absurdum of belligerent nationalisms—was both refractory and perilous. The notion that such an exploitative and self-centered American philosophy could somehow propel the United States in  tangibly gainful directions was erroneous on its face.[12] The Natural Rights premises of the US Declaration of Independence and US Constitution emphasize equality and cooperation as  universal human values.[13] Such emphases are indispensable to species survival, and ought never to be minimized.

Assorted particularities are now worth noting. In the words of 17th century jurist Samuel Pufendorf, whose legal philosophy was well-known to Thomas Jefferson and other Founding Fathers: "One of the common duties of the Natural Law is that no one who has not acquired a peculiar right arrogate more to himself than the rest may have, but permit others to enjoy the same rights as himself."[14] No American president (or any other national leader) can  claim such a right.

There is more. As an expression of Donald J. Trump's "personal brand" of belligerent nationalism, “America First” is reprehensible on moral grounds alone. Inter alia, this assessment can be made evident in broadly philosophic terms. To wit, the ethical derelictions of Donald Trump's acrimonious foreign policies violate timeless principles concerning decent and dignified human behavior. Most notable among these axiomatic principles are cooperation,[15] "oneness"[16] and community.[17]

"There is no longer a virtuous nation," laments Irish poet William Butler Yeats, "and the best of us live by candle light." Now, in the  midst of a second Trump administration, Americans have many things to consider. Under this president, policies that were once "merely" wrong have become openly murderous.[18] Ipso facto, there can be no reasonable justification for such derelictions.

There is more. As we have seen before during COVID, biological “plague” can reinforce the self-inflicted “pathologies” of governance. Now, during summer 2026, longstanding perils of anarchic world politics are being reinforced by new threats of pandemic, notably Ebola and Hantavirus.

Logically, such grievous threats mandate not a conspicuously self-defeating orientation to world politics, but far-reaching acknowledgments of global singularity and human “oneness.” Though fiercely retrograde Trump foreign policies are still being widely accepted and even lauded, American thinkers have continued to ignore the most deeply underlying survival problem of all: No foreign policy prescriptions founded on law-violating postures of belligerent nationalism can succeed long-term.[19]

While the charge may first sound like exaggeration, Donald Trump's bombastic inclinations are never “just” a matter of rhetoric. They threaten a destabilizing pattern of tangible harms, a virulent geometry with potentially unprecedented lethal consequences. The absurdist Trump vision of "America First" is leading the United States in cumulatively mistaken directions, not toward national or international advantage, but to endlessly Darwinian “struggles for existence.”

Such a retrograde vision ought never to be embraced by a “civilized nation,”[20] especially at moments of renewed pandemic peril. More precisely, the law-related obligation of civilized states and peoples to finally accept worldwide interdependence or “oneness” has never been greater.

There is more. Amid crudely fierce competitions between single states that would prove injurious to all, Americans should expect more stubbornly recalcitrant military conflicts. Derivatively, the futile Trump standard of "everyone for himself" would only produce expansive levels of human suffering. What else should  be expected from a president who prides himself on a carefully-cultivated legal and historical illiteracy?[21] This is a president, after all, who earlier urged (1) ingestion of household disinfectant to protect against Covid19; (2) consideration of nuclear weapons use against hurricanes and (3) further explorations of the Moon “because the Moon is part of Mars.”

In Trump I, things got even worse. In a flagrant reduction to absurdity, the president remarked that during the 18th century Revolutionary War, “The patriot army managed to gain and keep control of all national airports.” How could such a manifestly impossible remark not have immediately ended Trump’s acceptability? Credo quia absurdum, said Roman philosopher Tertullian: “I believe because it is absurd.”

The Primacy of “Mind”

"Intellect rots the brain" said Joseph Goebbels at a Nuremberg Germany rally in 1935.

"I love the poorly educated," said then presidential candidate Donald Trump at a 2016 election rally.

Where should America go now on law-based matters of global cooperation and global unity or “oneness”? The basic problem is too deep for resolution by periodic elections. Though it is certainly time for thinking citizens to distance themselves from Trump’s multiple law-violating policies, such efforts would still represent just the “tip” of essential changes. Over time, only a suitable expansion of human empathy could rescue this country and the planet as a whole. This suggests, among other things, that any such expansion by the United States would represent not a heroic act of charity - that is, a mistakenly one-sided species of characteristic American benevolence -  but a properly law-based expression of national policy.

There is a conceptual bottom line. US national interests can no longer be served in any serious manner at the deliberate expense of other states, especially in times of “plague.” Always, these American interests must be served together with the presumed interests of other states and nations, sometimes when international legal relations have already become chillingly adversarial.

In the end, only truth can be exculpatory. But what is the truth in such matters? At every crucial level - military, economic and biological - American security is linked with the wider "human condition." Among other things, what Americans witness hour by hour, minute by minute, during the intellectually-defiling Trump era is the dismantling of law-based world power. At a moment when new disease pandemic should make human solidarity more necessary than ever, America and the nations are moving toward more perilous kinds of fragmentation.

During this relentless Trump-era decline, Americans can no longer afford promises of national "greatness." At best, Trump-inscribed red hats represent a hideous self-parody. At worst, they point toward a glaringly obvious and widening path to "apocalypse."[22] For the foreseeable future, and in direct consequence of still-ongoing Trump-era derelictions, America's national policy expectations will need to be more expressly-based on reason,[23] law and serious thought.[24]

Such conclusions are anything but reassuring. Nonetheless, truth is always the final arbiter, not just in matters of law[25] and policy, but also in any critical judgments of ethics. Today's American national and geopolitical truth remains grim and sobering. To be sure, there are no credible correctives waiting to be uncovered in the Trump administration's seat-of-the-pants policy prescriptions.[26]

Empathy as a Double-Edged Sword

Especially ominous about Donald Trump's indifference to primal human interconnections and codified human rights[27] is his willful destruction of human caring. For Americans, the palpable consequences of such destructive orientations ought by now to be obvious. The monstrous global consequences of "Germany First"—a direct ideological antecedent of "America First"—should have exhibited enduring historical resonance.

Any gainful expansions of empathy to become law-based policy imperatives require a president and citizenry who are at least minimally versed in world history.[28] During the Trump years, however, America displays no such learning. Going forward, it is essential that America begin an intentional return to Reason, Law, Rationality and “Mind.”

There exist other and deeper global roots to the problems of empathy and cooperation. Divided into thousands of hostile tribes, almost two hundred of which are called "nation-states," too many human beings find it pleasing to slay certain "others." As for any remediating considerations of compassionate human feeling, that sentiment is typically reserved for those who already live within one’s own "tribe."

Expansions of empathy to include "outsiders" remain a basic condition of authentic peace, global union and “oneness.” Without such expansions, our entire species will remain dedicated to its own continuous debasement. Significantly, in an age of converging nuclear and biological hazards, such dedication would represent more than a regrettable obligation. It would be intentionally murderous.

What fixes, if any, are still available? What must Americans do in order to encourage far wider patterns of empathy, thereby fostering more caring feelings between as well as within "tribes"? In essence the question is this: How can a U.S. president work to meaningfully improve the state of a still-crumbling world legal order?[29] 

These are not easy questions, but they need to be asked. They comprise precisely the same queries that should be addressed more openly by Americans. So—what next?

Ironically, we must acknowledge, the essential expansion of empathy for the many could become “dreadful,” improving human community, but at some indecipherable cost of private sanity. This prospectively insufferable consequence is rooted in the way we humans were "designed;" that is, as more-or-less "hard wired" beings, ones with distinctly recognizable and largely "impermeable" boundaries of feeling. Were it otherwise, prima facie, an extended range of compassion toward too many others could bring about a single individual’s emotional collapse.

This key point should be easy to understand. As an example, one must consider how difficult it would be if all were to experience the same pangs of sympathy and compassion for those outside primary attachment spheres that are felt for family and friends who have been located "inside" these spheres.

For dedicated thinkers, all this presents a challenging intellectual paradox. It was already examined in the ancient Jewish legend of the Lamed-Vov, a Talmudic tradition that certain scholars trace back to Isaiah. Here, the world is said to rest upon 36 Just Men, the Lamed-Vov. These long-suffering figures are otherwise indistinguishable from ordinary mortals. Still, if just one of their number were removed, the resultant tribulations of humankind would become staggering. So much so that they would even poison the souls of the newly-born.[30]

This Talmud-elucidated paradox holds potentially useful meanings for the United States. But it is an inherently paradoxical meaning. In essence, a widening circle of human compassion is both indispensable to civilizational survival and a lamentable source of private anguish. 

Subsidiary questions arise. Going forward, how shall American leaders deal capably with any requirement for global civilization that is simultaneously necessary and unbearable? Newly informed that empathy for the many is a precondition of any decent and functioning world society, what can create such empathy without producing intolerable pain? Recalling Ralph Waldo Emerson and the American Transcendentalists, "high-thinkers" should promptly inquire: How can we be released from the misconceived ideology of "America First," a zero-sum posture that has been increasing the prospects not only of war, terrorism and genocide, but also of uncontrollable disease pandemics?[31]

Understanding the World as System

The world is a system. "The existence of system in the world is at once obvious to every observer of nature," says the Jesuit philosopher, Pierre Teilhard de Chardin, "no matter whom...Each element of the Cosmos is positively woven from all the others...."

Americans should finally understand that the state of their national union can never be better than the state of the wider and interrelated world. This key truth obtains not "only" in reference to the usual issues of war, peace and international law,[32] but also to renewable expectations of pandemic.

For the imperiled United States, the overarching presidential objective should be to protect the sacred dignity of each individual human “soul.”[33] More precisely, this is the high-minded and ancient goal that should now offer theory-based policy direction[34] to a US President.[35]  In all such survival matters, nothing could be more practical than good theory.

It will be easy to dismiss such seemingly lofty recommendations as silly, ethereal or "academic." In reality, however, there could be no greater presidential naiveté than to champion the false extremity of "everyone for himself." Not only is this Trump Era extremity illogical and self-destructive, it is contrary to this nation's founding principles of Natural Law - principles expressed most famously by German jurist Samuel Pufendorf,  Dutch scholar Hugo Grotius and Swiss thinker Emmerich de Vattel.[36] All such principles exhibit core elements of human "oneness."[37]

Without a suitable expansion of empathy, we will remain at the mercy not just of other predatory human beings, but also of variously virulent pathogens. Whether suddenly or in increments, the harmful synergies created by such unwelcome combinations would become palpably unbearable. That point could represent planet Earth’s eleventh-hour.

The cumulative lesson here should be clear. Only by placing "Humanity First" could an American president make "America First." The latter, which now includes an obligation to combat disease pandemics as well as war, terrorism and genocide,[38] is not possible without the former. First, however, there must be suitable and widespread "conviction."[39]

America and the wider world could learn from Rabbi Avraham Kook[40]  that global unity is not something "outside." It exists "inside," within all of us. The first task therefore must be to acknowledge this benevolent in-dwelling of jurisprudential judgment and serious philosophy. The second is to adapt this judgment and philosophy as a guiding source of world policy transformations.[41] Unless we can all move more strenuously beyond the belligerent nationalism that holds sway during the law-violating Trump Era, there will be no residual places of safety or sanctuary.

Microcosm, Macrocosm and Human “Oneness”

One last "linkage" needs to be acknowledged. This references the indissoluble nexus between “macrocosm” and “microcosm,” a link between world legal processes and Kierkegaard’s “Singular One."[42] Everything on this planet will ultimately depend on the dignity, courage[43] and "emancipation" of each individual human being.  This includes a viable system of international law.

In his seminal essay Who is Man? (1965), philosopher Abraham J. Heschel laments: "The emancipated man is yet to emerge." The remedy? Heschel asks all human beings to raise the following elemental questions with themselves: "What is expected of men (sic, people)?" "What is demanded of me?"[44]

An obligation to resist mass (Nietzsche would prefer the term "herd," Freud "horde," or Kierkegaard  "crowd") is taken by Heschel as prerequisite to a decent and peaceful "macrocosm."[45] Thinking, like Nietzsche, Freud, Kierkegaard,  Jung, Ortega y Gasset and others (i.e., that camouflage and concealment in the mass should finally give way to "being-challenged-in-the-world”), Heschel’s thought can help clarify America’s current obligation to "get beyond” belligerent nationalism. It’s high time to demand of our national leaders a more consistently abiding respect for law and logic, not to turn away from obvious truth because of narrowly egoistic presumptions of interest.

All this reveals a clarifying irony. For Americans who tolerate or still celebrate Donald Trump's flagrant legal derelictions—including his de facto support of Russian aggressions against Ukraine—the cumulative costs of this attitude will be overwhelming. Accordingly, even if it might first seem naïve, Emersonian “high-thinking” could produce various law-advancing correctives. In this connection we may recall Italian film director Federico Fellini’s bold assertion: “The visionary is the only realist.”

Notes

[1] The history of western philosophy and jurisprudence includes illustrious advocates of global unity or “oneness.” Notable among them are Voltaire and Goethe. More precisely, we may recall Voltaire’s biting satire in the early chapters of Candide and Goethe’s oft-repeated comment linking belligerent nationalism to declining stages of civilization. We may also note Samuel Johnson’s conviction that patriotism “is the last refuge of a scoundrel;” William Lloyd Garrison’s observation that “We cannot acknowledge allegiance to any human government…Our country is the world, our countryman is all mankind;” and Thorsten Veblen’s comment that “The patriotic spirit is at cross-purposes with modern life.” Similar sentiments are discoverable in Friedrich Nietzsche’s Human, all too Human. Scholars may also recall Santayana’s coalescing remark in Reason and Society: “A man’s feet must be planted in his country, but his eyes should survey the world.” The unifying point of all such remarks is that narrow-minded patriotism is not “merely” injurious, it is also “unpatriotic.” Though proclaimed with robotic fanfare, such patriotism can never serve the tangible interests of any state’s citizens or subjects.

[2] Under international law, the question of whether or not a formal "state of war" exists between states is generally ambiguous. Traditionally, it was held that a declaration of war was necessary before any true state of war could be said to exist. Hugo Grotius divided wars into declared wars, which were legal, and undeclared wars, which were not. (See Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace, Bk. III, Chapters. III, IV, and XI.) By the start of the twentieth century, the position that war obtains only after a conclusive declaration of war by one of the parties was codified by Hague Convention III. This treaty stipulated that hostilities must never commence without a "previous and explicit warning" in the form of a declaration of war or an ultimatum. (See Hague Convention III Relative to the Opening of Hostilities, 1907, 3 NRGT, 3 series, 437, article 1.) Currently, declarations of war may be tantamount to admissions of international criminality, because of the express criminalization of aggression by authoritative international law, and it could therefore represent a clear jurisprudential absurdity to tie any true state of war to formal and prior declarations of belligerency. It follows that a state of war may now exist without any formal declarations, but only if there exists an actual armed conflict between two or more states and/or at least one of these states considers itself “at war."

[3] The legal and historical origins of this war-oriented dynamic lie in the Peace of Westphalia (1648), a treaty which brought into being the extant state-system. See: Treaty of Peace of Munster, Oct. 1648, 1 Consol. T.S. 271; and Treaty of Peace of Osnabruck, Oct. 1648, 1., Consol. T.S. 119, Taken together, these two treaties comprise the Peace of Westphalia.

[4] Since the Peace of Westphalia, the idea of a balance of power – an idea of which the nuclear-age balance of terror is a current variant – has never been more than a facile metaphor. In essence, treaty language notwithstanding, it has never had anything to do with ascertaining or maintaining a "true and just equilibrium" of power. As such a balance must ultimately be a matter of individual subjective perceptions, adversarial states can never be reasonably confident that strategic circumstances of the moment are “balanced” in their favor. As each side must perpetually fear it will be "left behind," any corresponding search for balance can produce only ever-widening patterns of instability and disequilibrium.

[5] Ironically, international law, which remains an integral part of the legal system of all states, assumes a general and reciprocal obligation of each state to supply benefits to other states and to avoid war whenever possible. This core assumption of jurisprudential solidarity is known formally as a "peremptory" or jus cogens expectation, that is, one that is not ever subject to question. It can be found in Justinian, Corpus Juris Civilis, Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace (1625) and Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law (1758).

[6] Twentieth century writer and Nobel laureate Hermann Hesse would still likely respond: "The world as it is now, wants to die, wants to perish and it will." (See Steppenwolf, 1927).

[7] Such anarchy stands in stark contrast to the formal legal assumption of solidarity between states. This idealized assumption concerns a presumptively common struggle against aggression and terrorism. Such a "peremptory" expectation, known correctly in law as a jus cogens assumption, was already mentioned in Justinian, Grotius, and Vattel (supra). All three - Justinian, Grotius and Vattel - were familiar to Founding Fathers of the United States.

[8] Though composed in the seventeenth century, Thomas Hobbes' Leviathan may still describe a permanent vision of chaos in world politics. During such chaos, which is a "time of War," says the English philosopher in Chapter XIII ("Of the Natural Condition of Mankind, as concerning their Felicity, and Misery."):  "... every man is Enemy to every man... and where the life of man is solitary, poor, nasty, brutish, and short." Still, at the actual time of writing Leviathan, Hobbes believed that the condition of "nature" in world politics was less chaotic than that same condition among individual human beings. This is because of what he had called the "dreadful equality" of individual men in nature concerning the ability to kill others. Plainly, this once-relevant differentiation has effectively disappeared with the continuing manufacture and spread of nuclear weapons.

[9] In the generic clarification of Swiss psychologist and philosopher Carl G. Jung: "The mass crushes out the insight and reflection that are still possible with the individual, and this necessarily leads to doctrinaire and authoritarian tyranny if ever the constitutional State should succumb to a fit of weakness." (See, The Undiscovered Self, 1957).

[10] One should be reminded here of Bertrand Russell's trenchant observation in Principles of Social Reconstruction (1916): "Men fear thought more than they fear anything else on earth - more than ruin, more even than death."

[11] See, by this author, at Oxford University Press, Louis René Beres: https://blog.oup.com/2011/08/philosopher-king/

[12] For philosophical background of Realpolitik, see, by this author, Louis René Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: US Foreign Policy and World Order, Lexington Books, 1984; and Louis René Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America’s Countervailing Nuclear Strategy, Lexington Books, 1983. Regarding this background in law or jurisprudence: "Right is the interest of the stronger," says Thrasymachus in Bk. I, Sec. 338 of Plato, THE REPUBLIC (B. Jowett tr., 1875).  "Justice is a contract neither to do nor to suffer wrong," says Glaucon id., Bk. II, Sec. 359.  See also, Philus in Bk III, Sec. 5 of Cicero, DE REPUBLICA.

[13] See Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American Constitutional Law (1955); and Alexander P. d’ Entreves, Natural Law: An Introduction to Legal Philosophy (1951).

[14] See Pufendorf's On the Duty of Man and Citizen According to Natural Law (1673); Chapter "On Recognition of the Natural Equality of Men." In this section, Pufendord continues: "The same equality shows how a man should conduct himself, when he must assign their various rights to others, viz., that he must treat them as equals, and not indulge the one as against the other, except on the merits of the case." Pufendorf was familiar to the American Founding Fathers.

[15] Neither international law nor US law specifically advises any particular penalties or sanctions for states that choose not to prevent or punish genocide committed by others. Nonetheless, all states, most notably the "major powers" belonging to the UN Security Council, are bound, among other things, by the peremptory obligation (defined at Article 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties) known as pacta sunt servanda, to act in continuous "good faith." In turn, this pacta sunt servanda obligation is itself derived from an even more basic norm of world law. Commonly known as "mutual assistance," this civilizing norm was most famously identified within the classical interstices of international jurisprudence, most notably by the eighteenth-century legal scholar, Emmerich de Vattel in The Law of Nations (1758).

[16] About such "oneness," we may learn from ancient Greek Stoic philosopher, Epictetus, "You are a citizen of the universe." A broader idea of "oneness" followed the death of Alexander in 322 BCE, and with it came a coinciding doctrine of "universality" or interconnectedness. By the Middle Ages, this political and social doctrine had fused with the notion of a Respublica Christiana, a worldwide Christian commonwealth, and Thomas, John of Salisbury and Dante were looking upon Europe as a single and unified Christian community. Below the level of God and his heavenly host, all the realm of humanity was to be considered as one. This is because all the world had been created for the same single and incontestable purpose; that is, to provide background for the necessary drama of human salvation. Only in its relationship to the universe itself was the world correctly considered as a part rather than a whole. Said Dante in De Monarchia: "The whole human race is a whole with reference to certain parts, and, with reference to another whole, it is a part. For it is a whole with reference to particular kingdoms and nations, as we have shown; and it is a part with reference to the whole universe, which is evident without argument." Today, the idea of human oneness can be fully justified/explained in more purely secular terms of understanding.

[17] Martin Buber identifies the essence of every living community as “meeting.” True community, says Buber, is an authentic “binding,” not merely a “bundling together.” Furthermore, in true community, each one commits his whole being in “God’s dialogue with the world,” and each stands firm and resolute throughout this dialogue.

[18] On the crime of genocide, see, by this author: Louis René Beres:  gwhttps://digitalcommons.lmu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://search.yahoo.com/&amp;httpsredir=1&amp;article=1151&amp;context=ilr

[19] "What is the good of passing from one untenable position to another," warns playwright Samuel Beckett in Endgame, "of seeking justification always on the same plane?"

[20] Inter alia, this term is used in formal international law and diplomacy at Article 38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice:  https://www.icj-cij.org/en/statute

[21] Still the best treatments of America's long-term disinterest in anything intellectual are Richard Hofstadter, Anti-intellectualism in American Life (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1964); and Jacques Barzun, The House of Intellect (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1959).

[22] The idea here of apocalypse seems to have been born in ancient Iran (Persia), specifically, with the Manichaeism of the Zoroastrians. Interestingly, however, at least one of these documents, The War of the Sons of Light Against the Sons of Darkness, found in a Qumran cave, is a comprehensive description of Jewish military tactics and regulations at the end of the Second Commonwealth. In essence, the "Sons of Light" were expected to prevail in battle against the "Sons of Darkness" before the "end of days," and the later fight at Masada was widely interpreted as an apocalyptic struggle between a saintly few and the wicked many.

[23] As we may learn from Karl Jaspers' Reason and Anti-Reason in our Time: (1952): "Reason is confronted again and again with the fact of a mass of believers who have lost all ability to listen, who can absorb no argument and who hold unshakably fast to the Absurd as an unassailable presupposition - and really do appear to believe." Could any words better describe the American "mass-man" (and "mass-woman") who preferred Donald Trump's Covid19 medical judgments to those of Dr. Anthony Fauci?

[24] In the 17th century, the French philosopher Blaise Pascal remarked prophetically in Pensées: "All our dignity consists in thought.... It is upon this that we must depend...Let us labor then to think well: this is the foundation of morality." Similar reasoning characterizes the writings of Baruch Spinoza, Pascal's 17th-century contemporary. In Book II of his Ethics Spinoza considers the human mind, or the intellectual attributes, and - drawing further from Descartes - strives to define an essential theory of learning and knowledge.

[25] These matters include expectations of Natural Law, which represent the original and core legal foundations of the United States. Natural Law is based upon the acceptance of certain principles of right and justice that prevail because of their own intrinsic merit.  Eternal and immutable, they are external to all acts of human will and interpenetrate all human reason.  This dynamic idea and its attendant tradition of human civility runs continuously from Mosaic Law and the ancient Greeks and Romans to the present day.  For a comprehensive and far-reaching assessment of the natural law origins of international law, see Louis René Beres, "Justice and Realpolitik:  International Law and the Prevention of Genocide," The American Journal of Jurisprudence, Vol. 33, 1988, pp. 123-159.  This article was adapted from Professor Beres' earlier presentation at the International Conference on the Holocaust and Genocide, Tel-Aviv, Israel, June 1982.

[26] "Who is to decide which is the grimmer sight," asks Honore de Balzac, "withered hearts, or empty skulls?"

[27] Because such indifference impacted legal standards that are fundamental and "permit no derogation," it represented a violation of "peremptory norms." According to Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “…a peremptory norm of general international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same character.” See: Supra; Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Done at Vienna, May 23, 1969. Entered into force, Jan. 27, 1980. U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 39/27 at 289 (1969), 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, reprinted in 8 I.L.M.  679 (1969).

[28] In the 17th century, the French philosopher Blaise Pascal remarked prophetically, in his justly celebrated Pensées: "All our dignity consists in thought.... It is upon this that we must depend...Let us labor then to think well: this is the foundation of morality." Similar reasoning characterizes the writings of Baruch Spinoza, Pascal's 17th-century contemporary. In Book II of his Ethics Spinoza considers the human mind, or the intellectual attributes, and - drawing further from Descartes - strives to define an essential theory of learning and knowledge. Much of this effort was founded upon familiar (to Spinoza) certain Jewish sources.

[29] The term "world order" has its contemporary origins in a scholarly movement begun at the Yale Law School in the mid- and late 1960s, and later “adopted” by the Politics Department at Princeton University in 1967-68. The present author was an early member of the Princeton-based World Order Models Project, and authored several early books and articles in this once-emergent academic genre.

[30] Both Sigmund Freud and Carl Jung thought of "soul" (in German, Seele) as the very essence of a human being. Neither Freud nor Jung ever provides a precise definition of the term, but clearly it was not intended by either in any ordinary religious sense. For both, it was a still-recognizable and critical seat of both mind and passions in this life. Interesting, too, in the present context, is that Freud explained his already-predicted decline of America by various express references to "soul." Freud was plainly disgusted by any civilization so apparently unmoved by considerations of true "consciousness" (e.g., awareness of intellect and literature), and even thought that the crude American commitment to perpetually shallow optimism and material accomplishment would occasion sweeping psychological misery.

[31] The most ominous synergies would link pandemic effects with growing risks of a nuclear war. On irrational nuclear decision-making by this author, see Louis René Beres, The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: https://thebulletin.org/2016/08/what-if-you-dont-trust-the-judgment-of-the-president-whose-finger-is-over-the-nuclear-button/ See also, by Professor Beres, https://warroom.armywarcollege.edu/articles/nuclear-decision-making/ (Pentagon). For authoritative early accounts by Professor Beres of nuclear war expected effects, see: Louis René Beres, Apocalypse: Nuclear Catastrophe in World Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Louis René Beres, Mimicking Sisyphus: America's Countervailing Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1983); Louis René Beres, Reason and Realpolitik: U.S. Foreign Policy and World Order (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1984); and Louis René Beres, Security or Armageddon: Israel's Nuclear Strategy (Lexington, Mass., Lexington Books, 1986). Most recently, by Professor Beres, see: Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel's Nuclear Strategy (New York, Rowman &amp; Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed. 2018). https://paw.princeton.edu/new-books/surviving-amid-chaos-israel%E2%80%99s-nuclear-strategy

[32] International law is part of US domestic law. In the precise words used by the U.S. Supreme Court in The Paquete Habana, "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained by the courts of justice of appropriate jurisdiction, as often as questions of right depending upon it are duly presented for their determination.  For this purpose, where there is no treaty, and no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the customs and usages of civilized nations."  See The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1900).  See also:  The Lola, 175 U.S. 677 (1900); Tel-Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F. 2d 774, 781, 788 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (per curiam) (Edwards, J. concurring) (dismissing the action, but making several references to domestic jurisdiction over extraterritorial offenses), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1003 (1985) ("concept of extraordinary judicial jurisdiction over acts in violation of significant international standards...embodied in the principle of `universal violations of international law.'").

[33] “The loftier the soul,” wrote Rabbi Avraham Kook, “the more it feels the unity that there is in us all.”

[34] "Theories are nets," reminds Karl Popper, citing to the German poet Novalis, "only he who casts, will catch." See Popper's epigraph to his classic, The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959). Ironically, Novalis' fellow German poet, Goethe, declared, in his early Faust fragment (Urfaust): "All theory, dear friend, is grey. But the golden tree of life is green."

[35] In Jewish tradition, empathy, justice and individual human dignity can together bring forth a vast and indispensable healing. Such key traits, commented Rabbi Avraham Kook, a thinker who was not a part of the classical stream of Jewish philosophy, must "flow directly from the holy depth of the wisdom of the Divine soul." Rabbi Kook's thinking does not stand in any stark or self-conscious opposition to rational and scientific investigation, nor does it intend to oppose pure feelings to raw intellect. It identifies instead a potentially useful creative tension, one between a too-abstract and too-formal intellectualism and a promisingly practical form of reason. Influenced and informed by Buddhism, Rabbi Kook envisioned humankind as possessing a natural evolutionary inclination toward collective advancement and self-perfection. Moreover, he surmised, the course of this human evolution must be directed toward a progressively increased spirituality. In the final analysis, Kook understood Torah as a tangible and incontrovertible manifestation of Divine Will on earth.

[36] See, for example, Grotius The Law of War and Peace (1625) and Vattel, The Law of Nations or Principles of Natural Law (1758).

[37] "The dust from which the first man was made was gathered in all the four corners of the world (Talmud). This Talmudic axiom closely parallels the presumptions of Natural Law, presumptions central to fashioning the core documents of the United States. For a time, American law and legal policy, founded of course upon the learned jurisprudence of Sir William Blackstone, had acknowledged the ubiquitous obligation of all states to help one another. According to Blackstone, each state is always expected "to aid and enforce the law of nations, as part of the common law, by inflicting an adequate punishment upon offenses against that universal law...." See: 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, Book 4, "Of Public Wrongs." Lest anyone ask about the significance of Blackstone for now-current US national security policies, one need only point out that Commentaries were an original and core foundation of the laws of the United States. It goes without saying that this fact remains unknown to US President Donald Trump or his determined acolytes. To wit, Trump policies of "America First" represent the diametric opposite of what Blackstone would have had urged or expected.

[38] Professor Louis René Beres is the author of several books and law journal articles on genocide-like crimes. See, for example, Louis René Beres, "Genocide and Genocide-Like Crimes," in M. Cherif Bassiouni., ed., International Criminal Law: Crimes (New York, Transnational Publishers, 1986), pp. 271-279.

[39] "The best lack all conviction," reminds poet William Butler Yeats in The Second Coming, "while the worst are full of passionate intensity."

[40] According to Rabbi Kook, a final Divine redemption must be undertaken by and through the Jewish People. A core part of any such redemption must be the palpably greater awareness of human unity, or human oneness. In turn, proceeds this dialectic, awareness will ultimately give rise to the spreading light of loving kindness and forgiveness, even amid the eternally bitter rancor of world politics.

[41] We learn from 20th century German philosopher Karl Jaspers (Man in the Modern Age, 1951): "Everyone knows that the world situation in which we live is not a final one."

[42] The writings of Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard focus very explicitly on the true individual or “Single One.” For Kierkegaard, the most ruinous human evasion of all is to hide oneself within a “crowd.” The crowd, says Kierkegaard famously, is “untruth. Intellectually, it resembles what Germans philosopher Martin Heidegger later lamented as “das Man” or “The They.”

[43] See, by this author. Professor Louis René Beres, at Yale Global (Yale University) https://archive-yaleglobal.yale.edu/content/call-intellect-and-courage

[44] Jewish visionary Abraham J. Heschel complements the foundational insights of Francis Bacon, Galileo and Isaac Newton and more recently Lewis Mumford: "Civilization,” says Heschel in Who Is Man? “is the never ending process of creating one world and one humanity."

[45] "Is it an end that draws near," inquired Karl Jaspers, "or a beginning?" The answer will depend, in large part, on what another major post-war German philosopher had to say about the Jungian or Freudian "mass." In his own classic study, Being and Time (1953), Martin Heidegger laments what he calls, in German, das Mann, or "The They."  Drawing fruitfully upon earlier core insights of Nietzsche, Kierkegaard, Jung and Freud, Heidegger's "The They" represent the ever-present herd, crowd, horde or mass, an "untruth" (the term favored by Danish philosopher Soren Kierkegaard) that can all-too-quickly suffocate personal growth and identity.

LOUIS RENÉ BERES (Ph.D. Princeton, 1971) is the author of many books and articles dealing with literature, art, philosophy and international relations. Emeritus Professor of International Law at Purdue, he was born in Zürich at the end of World War II. Dr. Beres' twelfth book is Surviving Amid Chaos: Israel's Nuclear Strategy (Rowman &amp; Littlefield, 2016; 2nd ed. 2018)). His writings can be found in The New York Times; The Atlantic; Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists; The Hudson Review; JURIST; Modern Diplomacy; American Journal of International Law; US News &amp; World Report; Princeton Political Review; World Politics (Princeton); Yale Global; Harvard National Security Journal (Harvard Law School); International Security (Harvard); Horasis (Zurich); Oxford University Press; Cambridge University Press; The War Room (Pentagon); Modern War Institute (West Point); Air-Space Operations Review (USAF); BESA (Israel); Israel Defense and more than a dozen national and international law journals. An earlier advisory editor for Oxford University Press on its annual Yearbook on Jurisprudence and International Law, Professor Beres is a seven-times contributor to this benchmark legal publication.

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            <title>The Economics of Adult Migration and Birthright Citizenship: Who Really Pays the Price?</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/06/the-economics-of-adult-migration-and-birthright-citizenship-who-really-pays-the-price/</link>
            <pubDate>Tue, 09 Jun 2026 23:23:06 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>L. Ali Khan | Washburn University School of Law</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109639</guid>
            <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Citizenship Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment of the US Constitution grants citizenship to nearly all children born in the United States, regardless of whether their parents are citizens, permanent residents, unauthorized migrants, or transient visitors. Limited exceptions exist, such as children born to accredited foreign diplomats, who are not subject to US jurisdiction. This longstanding interpretation of birthright citizenship is now the subject of a legal challenge. In Trump v. Barbara, the US Supreme Court heard oral arguments in April 2026 on an Executive Order seeking to restrict the application of the Clause, with a decision expected by early July.

It is widely held in legal circles that birthright citizenship is strictly a constitutional question. Even broad immigration debates are often framed in humanitarian, cultural or political terms, focusing on legal and illegal immigrants, border security, social tensions, and family unification and integrity. Yet beneath these debates lies a resource question that receives far less attention: who bears the cost of producing human capital, and who ultimately receives its benefits?

Human capital refers to a person's potential to create wealth through employment, entrepreneurship, or other economic activities.  Numerous studies have documented the economic contributions of working-age migrants. For instance, research by the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017) and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) consistently finds that adult migrants often generate net wealth over their lifetimes, particularly when they have higher levels of education and skills.

Generally, migration involves a tripartite analysis of the migrant, the recipient state, and the sending country that supplies migrants. Building on migration studies, but without any intention to commodify humans, the central thesis of this commentary treats adult migrants as human capital developed by the sending country using its domestic resources, while the recipient state receives the adult migrant for free and reaps a substantial economic windfall. While migrants improve their personal circumstances, source countries frequently lose out on their investment.

However, even for receiving states, the economic model fails for birthright immigrant children and unauthorized immigrants, both of whom are high-risk entrants with uncertain economic productivity.

To clarify the dynamics of wealth windfalls for the recipient nation, the following hypothetical model illustrates the economic asymmetries that arise from adult migration patterns. It also sheds light on contemporary debates over birthright citizenship and unauthorized immigration. The numbers in the model are for illustrative purposes only, though they are directionally accurate.
The Wealth Windfall Model
Suppose a migrant moves from Country A to Country B at age 25. Country A allocates its economic, social, healthcare, and educational resources to raise the migrant from birth to age 25. These expenditures include the costs of birth, pediatric care, food, clothing, and primary and secondary education. For highly skilled emigrants, such as physicians, engineers, and other professionals, Country A bears the additional cost of college and professional training. In the United States, the average cost to fully train a physician is estimated at approximately $1.1 million or more.

Assume that in Country A, the total investment required to raise an emigrant is $100,000 in PPP (Purchasing Power Parity, a better standard for measuring costs because it accounts for local conditions). All figures below are in PPP terms. This figure is significantly higher for highly skilled emigrants.

Country B receives the adult migrant as human capital at nearly zero cost, filtered through immigration laws. The migrant works in Country B for 25 years and contributes a gross value of $2 million to Country B’s GDP, averaging $80,000 per year. After taxes, the migrant’s net take-home is $1.5 million, which the migrant acquires as a private asset.

The migrant sends $1,000 in remittances annually to support his family in Country A, resulting in total remittances of $25,000 over 25 years.

Country A’s Loss (over a 50-year period from birth to the last remittance): Investment of $100,000 minus remittances of $25,000 equals a net loss of $75,000. Country A thus bears the full cost of human capital formation, with only a limited offset from remittances. It also loses the migrant’s productive value. Country A’s economic losses would be significant if it could employ potential migrants gainfully, such as physicians and engineers who move abroad. The sending country’s loss is greatest when skilled workers leave permanently and cannot be replaced domestically.

Country B’s Windfall (over the 25-year working period): acquires the migrant for free, whose gross GDP contribution is $2 million, less $25,000 in remittance outflows, yielding a windfall of $1,975,000. In addition, Country B benefits from taxes paid by the migrant, from the migrant’s consumption (housing, vehicles, food, and services), which supports local industries, and from any savings held in local financial institutions that contribute to domestic capital formation.

The numbers used in the model vary from case to case, depending on the migrant's qualifications and income, the cost of raising an adult in the sending state, the standard of living in the receiving state, the length of employment, income, taxes paid, the amount of remittances, and the migrant’s expenses and savings.

The model does not imply that sending countries invariably lose from emigration. Remittances, diaspora investment, technology transfer, and return migration may partially or fully offset the developmental costs. The magnitude of the loss depends on how readily the sending country can replace emigrants or capture indirect benefits from its diaspora.
Profitable Migrants
Most developed countries seek migrants as externally developed human capital. The windfall model does not imply that emigrants are owned by their countries of origin or that states have a property interest in their citizens. The argument is purely about the transfer of human capital. Regardless of who directly bears the developmental costs, families, communities, or governments, the receiving state gains a productive adult whose formative investments have already been made.

The notion of brain drain has long been a familiar way to view migration. However, brain drain is merely a specialized form of a broader phenomenon: the transfer of individuals as a form of human capital. A physician emigrating is brain drain. A taxi driver emigrating may or may not be brain drain. Yet both involve the transfer of productive assets that the sending country developed using its domestic resources and then gifted them to the recipient state.

According to the latest global data compiled by the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA), international migration flows remain highly concentrated. In 2024, only 3.7 percent of the global population of over 8 billion migrated to other countries, compared with 2.9 percent in 1990.  Thus, over 96 percent of people live where they were born.

Over nearly 35 years, between 1990 and 2024, the United States was the top immigrant-receiving country, with 52.4 million immigrants.  In the same period, the other four top countries were Germany with 16.8 million, Saudi Arabia with 13.7 million, the United Kingdom with 11.8 million, and France with 9.2 million. In some Gulf States, immigrants constitute the majority of the population, though without civil and political rights.

On the supply side, India ranks first, with 18.5 million individuals sent to other countries worldwide between 1990 and 2024. The other four top sending countries in the same period are China with 11.7 million, Mexico with 11.6 million, Ukraine with 9.8 million, and the Russian Federation with 9.1 million.

In most developed countries, the sought-after migrants may include physicians, nurses, entrepreneurs, engineers, taxi drivers, chefs, and sometimes even low-skilled workers. Contemporary migration flows include Filipino nurses, South Asian physicians and engineers moving to the United States and Europe, as well as millions of South Asian laborers working in the Gulf states.

These examples illustrate that migration involves not only the movement of people with diverse cultures, religions, national origins, and occupations, but also the transfer of human capital from one country to another.

The windfall model demonstrates the benefits of acquiring a fully developed adult worker. The birthright citizenship section below explores how the model fails for immigrant children and unauthorized migrants, forcing the recipient state to assume the very costs it seeks to avoid by legally screening adult migrants for potential wealth-generating education and skills.
Birthright Citizenship, Child Migration, and Unauthorized Immigration
Ultimately, the human capital transfer model hinges on the migrant's age at the time of border crossing. Recipient states derive their greatest economic advantage when much of the developmental investment has already been made in a foreign country. The recipient state gains access to the migrant's productive years without compensating the sending country. It is against this raw fiscal backdrop that contemporary legal friction over birthright citizenship, child migration, and unauthorized immigration must be understood.

A newborn or young child arriving in the recipient state has a different economic profile. The recipient state assumes the costs of childhood healthcare, schooling, social services, and other developmental investments before any productive contribution is realized. According to estimates published by the US Department of Agriculture, the cost of raising a child to age 18 in the United States may exceed $300,000 for a middle-income household, excluding higher education.

Thus, birthright citizenship and child immigration undermine the paradigm of productivity associated with legally filtered adult migrants, who are treated as human capital. From a purely fiscal perspective, a migrant child is a risky long-term investment rather than a more certain, immediately productive asset. However, empirical evidence shows that the US-born children of immigrants—the second generation—often become strong fiscal contributors over their lifetimes. According to the National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine (2017), second-generation immigrants often surpass both their parents and the native-born population in educational attainment, earnings, and net tax contributions.

A somewhat related framework highlights concerns about unauthorized immigration. Legal immigration allows recipient states to screen applicants based on age, education, skills, health status, language proficiency, and anticipated economic contribution. Unauthorized immigration bypasses this screening process, even though unauthorized adult migrants developed in foreign countries are also potentially human capital.

When opposing unauthorized immigration, the central economic concern is not merely legality but productive uncertainty. Without prior selection, the recipient state cannot accurately estimate the future productive value of unauthorized migrants. Yet, according to the Institute on Taxation and Economic Policy (2024), undocumented immigrants in the U.S. paid approximately $96.7 billion in federal, state, and local taxes in 2022, including substantial contributions to Social Security and Medicare programs from which they are largely ineligible.
Conclusion
Immigration is often discussed in humanitarian, cultural, or political terms. Yet it also represents a large-scale international transfer of human capital, mostly from poorer to richer countries. For decades, contrary to political rhetoric, the economic benefits that migrants bring to host countries have been extensively documented.

Regardless of how immigration policies are formulated, the underlying economic logic remains the same: recipient states generally favor adult, legally vetted migrants whose productive potential can be assessed in advance and whose developmental costs have largely been incurred elsewhere. From the perspective of recipient states, adult migration is often one of the cheapest ways to acquire productive labor through well-developed immigration filters.

Birthright citizenship undermines the paradigm of ready-made productive capital. Instead of absorbing the upfront cost of raising and educating a child, especially when the parents are indigent, some policymakers target birthright citizenship, even though it is a constitutional right, because the child fails the immediate productivity test and is considered an investment risk. This economic reality explains why opposition to birthright citizenship rests on fiscal utility rather than legal grounds alone. The Supreme Court may consider many arguments in the birthright citizenship case, but it must treat the child as a constitutional person, not as an economic asset whose value must be proven first.

Ali Khan is the founder of Legal Scholar Academy and an Emeritus Professor of Law at the Washburn University School of Law in Topeka, Kansas. He has written numerous scholarly articles and commentaries on international law. In addition, he has regularly contributed to JURIST since 2001. He welcomes comments via email.]]></content:encoded>
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            <title>Beyond Sovereignty: The Legal and Moral Case for Treating Hormuz as a Global Trust</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/05/beyond-sovereignty-the-legal-and-moral-case-for-treating-hormuz-as-a-global-trust/</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 23:56:12 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>AmirAli Maleki</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109634</guid>
            <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[In Iranian family gatherings, geopolitics rarely arrives through academic language. It emerges through instinct, irritation, memory, and the peculiar intimacy with which ordinary people discuss the fate of nations while passing tea across a crowded room.

That evening had begun like many others: fruit on the table, the television murmuring in the background, someone complaining about inflation, someone else speaking about emigration. Then the news shifted to the Persian Gulf. Oil tankers appeared on the screen, moving slowly through the narrow waters of the Strait of Hormuz beneath dramatic music and headlines about global energy markets. My father looked up and said with complete certainty: “Iran and Oman should charge every ship that passes through Hormuz. Why should the whole world use it for free?”

My uncle immediately agreed. “Exactly. The world benefits from it, but we carry the danger. Who protects the strait? Who pays for the security?” I answered carefully: “But Hormuz does not entirely belong to Iran.” My father frowned. “Then whose is it?” Before I could respond, another relative interrupted from across the room: “What about the Suez Canal? Or Panama? They charge ships.” I shook my head. “Those are artificial canals built by human beings. Hormuz is different. It existed before modern states, before maritime law, before these governments. It is not infrastructure in the ordinary sense. It is geography itself.”

For a moment, the room fell quiet. Then everyone began speaking at once. Sovereignty. Oil. America. Trade. Security. National pride. Yet beneath the noise of that ordinary family argument, another question slowly emerged in my mind — one deeper than the familiar rhetoric of nationalism or maritime strategy. The issue was not simply whether ships should pay to cross Hormuz. The issue was more fundamental: what exactly is the Strait of Hormuz? Is it property? Territory? A strategic weapon? Or is it something closer to an entrusted space — an amanah?

The modern international order struggles to classify places such as the Strait of Hormuz because they exist simultaneously within multiple legal and political categories. The strait is geographically local yet economically global; territorially bordered yet internationally indispensable. Iran and Oman exercise sovereignty over surrounding territorial waters, yet the strategic function of Hormuz transcends the authority of either state individually.

Nearly a fifth of globally traded oil passes through this narrow maritime corridor. The stability of international markets, industrial production, and energy systems depends heavily upon its uninterrupted openness. Hormuz therefore occupies an ambiguous position within international law: neither fully national nor fully international, neither entirely sovereign nor entirely common.

Under the contemporary law of the sea, uninterrupted transit passage through international straits constitutes a foundational principle of global navigation. Strategic waterways cannot simply become instruments of arbitrary sovereign control. From this perspective, any attempt by coastal states to transform Hormuz into a source of unrestricted political rent appears legally suspect. The strait cannot become the private toll road of any government.

Yet this principle is often misunderstood in overly simplistic terms. There exists an important distinction between imposing a sovereign tax upon passage itself and recovering costs associated with maintaining the conditions that make safe passage possible. Ships do not move through an abstract legal principle called “free navigation.” They move through environmentally vulnerable and militarily sensitive waters requiring permanent systems of surveillance, navigational coordination, ecological protection, emergency response infrastructure, anti-smuggling operations, search-and-rescue mechanisms, and maritime security. Stability is not naturally free. It is continuously produced through institutions, labor, infrastructure, and political responsibility.

The global economy nevertheless tends to imagine geography as costless. International markets benefit immensely from the stability of Hormuz, while the environmental vulnerability, militarization, ecological risk, and geopolitical instability generated by that same circulation remain concentrated within the Gulf itself. This asymmetry creates a form of structural imbalance in which global benefit and local burden become unevenly distributed.

From this perspective, the distinction between a “toll” and a “functional contribution” becomes crucial. Coastal states cannot legitimately demand payment merely because ships happen to cross waters adjacent to their territory. Yet it is far more difficult to deny the legitimacy of non-discriminatory contributions dedicated specifically to maritime safety, environmental preservation, navigational infrastructure, and emergency response systems. The issue is therefore not whether Hormuz may generate financial obligations at all, but rather the moral and legal basis upon which those obligations are justified.

It is precisely at this point that Islamic jurisprudence becomes intellectually relevant in an unexpectedly modern way. Modern political thought frequently understands sovereignty through the language of ownership. States are imagined as proprietors exercising near-absolute authority over territory and resources. Yet both Sunni and Shi‘i traditions of Islamic jurisprudence often approached authority differently. The distinction between milk — unrestricted ownership — and amanah — entrusted responsibility — occupied a central role within Islamic legal and ethical thought. Certain things, especially those connected to collective welfare, could not legitimately become objects of unrestricted domination.

The Qur’anic notion of amanah offers a striking alternative to modern ideas of sovereign possession. In Qur’an 33:72, responsibility itself is described as a trust carried by humanity:
Indeed, We offered the Trust (al-amanah) to the heavens and the earth and the mountains, but they declined to bear it and feared it; yet man undertook it.
Classical Muslim scholars did not interpret amanah merely as personal honesty or private morality. Abu Hamid al-Ghazali understood entrusted responsibility as inseparable from accountability before both God and society. Al-Qurtubi, in his Qur’anic exegesis, interpreted amanah broadly as encompassing obligations tied to governance, justice, public duty, and social responsibility. In Shi‘i political jurisprudence, the idea of wilayah over public affairs was likewise never meant to imply unrestricted ownership over collective resources. Authority existed conditionally, tied to preservation of maslahah — the public welfare — and constrained by accountability before both society and God.

This distinction becomes especially important in relation to public resources and shared spaces. A widely cited Prophetic narration states:
People are partners in three things: water, pasture, and fire.
Both Sunni and Shi‘i jurists historically treated this narration as evidence that certain foundational resources necessary for collective life could not legitimately become subjects of arbitrary monopolization. Waterways, shared access routes, and collectively beneficial resources belonged within the domain of public benefit rather than absolute sovereign appropriation. In Shi‘i legal reasoning, discussions surrounding bayt al-mal — the public treasury — similarly reinforced the idea that rulers act not as proprietors of public wealth, but as trustees temporarily responsible for administering resources on behalf of the community.

The Strait of Hormuz can be understood through precisely this conceptual framework. Hormuz is not merely territorial property adjacent to Iran and Oman. It is entrusted geography: a globally consequential passage geographically administered by coastal states yet functionally tied to the welfare of the international community as a whole. Iran and Oman therefore appear not as unrestricted proprietors of the strait, but as custodians — amins — responsible for preserving navigational stability, environmental sustainability, and secure passage.

The significance of this distinction cannot be overstated. If Hormuz is understood exclusively through the language of ownership, then the strait inevitably becomes either a nationalist symbol or a geopolitical weapon. Under such a framework, charging ships appears either as sovereign entitlement or coercive extortion. But if Hormuz is approached through the framework of amanah, the logic changes fundamentally. A trustee cannot arbitrarily exploit what has been entrusted to them. At the same time, however, a trustee cannot reasonably be expected to absorb all burdens associated with preservation while others benefit freely from the existence of the trust itself.

Here Islamic jurisprudence and modern international law unexpectedly converge. The legal regime governing international straits already limits absolute sovereign control in favor of preserving a broader collective interest: global navigation. The Islamic concept of amanah similarly limits unrestricted domination over shared resources in favor of public welfare and responsible stewardship. Both frameworks, despite emerging from radically different intellectual traditions, arrive at a remarkably similar principle: strategic spaces that sustain collective life cannot legitimately become instruments of arbitrary extraction.

This convergence creates the possibility of a more nuanced legal and philosophical framework for Hormuz. Under such a framework, Iran and Oman could not legitimately “sell passage” through the strait in the manner of private owners monetizing personal property. Yet they may possess a defensible claim to recovering costs directly connected to preserving navigational safety, environmental protection, maritime rescue systems, ecological monitoring, and regional stability. Such contributions would derive legitimacy not from sovereign domination, but from custodial responsibility.

Hormuz therefore behaves less like passive geography and more like a political being. It shapes military doctrine, reorganizes energy markets, influences diplomatic alignments, generates global anxieties, and periodically destabilizes financial systems thousands of miles away from the Gulf itself. Entire economies react to its vulnerability. States speak about it as though it were an actor rather than a location. This is precisely why reducing it to the language of territorial possession alone feels conceptually insufficient. Hormuz does not merely belong to politics; it actively produces politics.

The environmental dimension of this argument is equally important. The Persian Gulf constitutes one of the world’s most fragile marine ecosystems. The dense concentration of oil tankers and commercial vessels crossing Hormuz generates continuous ecological risk: oil spills, marine contamination, habitat destruction, and long-term environmental degradation. Both international environmental law and Islamic legal ethics place significant emphasis upon the prevention of harm. Classical legal maxims such as “harm must be removed” and “there shall be neither harm nor reciprocating harm” acquire renewed relevance when applied to modern ecological vulnerability. Environmental protection therefore becomes not an external justification imposed upon the region from abroad, but an intrinsic obligation arising from the very logic of custodianship itself.

Yet the legitimacy of such a model ultimately depends upon a condition that cannot be ignored: political accountability. Trusteeship without accountability collapses into appropriation. This is the central weakness of the contemporary Iranian state. Any argument for functional maritime contributions immediately encounters international skepticism because the governing structure of the Islamic Republic lacks the institutional transparency necessary for credible custodianship. A state characterized by opaque financial institutions, militarization, ideological confrontation, and limited public accountability cannot convincingly distinguish between legitimate infrastructural contributions and geopolitical coercion.

This point is essential because it prevents the argument from collapsing into mere nationalism. The issue is not whether Iran can maximize profit from geography. The issue is whether a coastal state can legitimately act as trustee of a globally significant passage. Such legitimacy cannot emerge from military power alone. It requires transparent institutions, accountable governance, independent oversight, and a demonstrable commitment to public welfare rather than factional or ideological interests.

For this reason, the future of Hormuz is inseparable from political transformation within Iran itself. Only under a genuinely accountable political order could a system of non-discriminatory maritime service contributions become ethically persuasive and internationally credible. Under such conditions, revenues connected to Hormuz could be directed transparently toward environmental restoration, maritime infrastructure, coastal development, ecological monitoring systems, and navigational safety rather than militarized patronage networks or geopolitical confrontation.

The deeper significance of Hormuz therefore extends far beyond maritime law alone. It concerns the moral language through which humanity understands strategic geography itself. Modern politics has become accustomed to interpreting strategic spaces exclusively through sovereignty, possession, and domination. Yet certain places exceed the logic of ownership because their function sustains entire regions, economies, and populations simultaneously. Their significance cannot be contained entirely within the borders of any single nation-state.

Long after the conversation ended, the television continued showing tankers crossing dark water. My relatives gradually returned to ordinary subjects. Someone refilled the tea glasses. Someone else changed the channel. Yet the question remained suspended in the room long after the voices had faded: What does it mean to inherit a geography upon which the entire world depends, yet which no one can ever fully own? Perhaps that is the real tragedy — and responsibility — of the Strait of Hormuz.

AmirAli Maleki is a researcher specializing in international law and the philosophy of law, and the Editor of PraxisPublication.com. He works in the fields of political philosophy, Islamic philosophy, and hermeneutics. He is the recipient of JURIST’s 2026 David M. Crane Rule of Law award.]]></content:encoded>
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            <title>&#8216;This is Canada&#8217;s moment&#8217; — Former Canadian justice minister, UN prosecutor call on Ottawa to lead on Ukraine war crimes accountability</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/05/this-is-canadas-moment-former-canadian-justice-minister-un-prosecutor-call-on-ottawa-to-lead-on-ukraine-war-crimes-accountability/</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 15:30:07 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>Irwin Cotler | Former Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada and David M. Crane | Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109621</guid>
            <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The Canadian government is to be commended for its military, economic, and humanitarian assistance to Ukraine, including the most recent announcements of $270 million in military assistance and $2.5 billion in economic support.

Canada has also assumed an important role in international accountability efforts. Foreign Minister Anita Anand is co-chairing the International Coalition for the Return of Ukrainian Children—an initiative addressing one of the more horrific war crimes and crimes against humanity of Putin's Russia. This work reflects Canada's broader record of international leadership in the pursuit of justice and accountability, exemplified by its role in founding the ICC, championing the Responsibility to Protect doctrine, negotiating the landmine ban treaty, and its recent stewardship of the G7 on these matters.

Accordingly, as co-founders of the high-level working group advocating for a Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression Against Ukraine—founded immediately after Putin’s unprovoked and premeditated invasion of Ukraine—underpinned by mass atrocities constitutive of acts of genocide—we welcomed the June 2025 Ukrainian and Council of Europe agreement establishing the Special Tribunal, and more importantly, the recent endorsement by 36 countries (and counting) of the Special Tribunal, a watershed moment in the international struggle for justice and accountability.

The Canadian government should be at the forefront of this historic initiative—not a passive observer watching from the sidelines. Simply put, Canada’s passive role both in the establishment and the operationalization of the Special Tribunal undermines both its historical leadership in the pursuit of justice and accountability and its otherwise important military, economic, and humanitarian contributions to the struggle of the Ukrainian people.

The combating of the Crime of Aggression is foundational to the pursuit of justice and accountability, anchored in the UN Charter and the principles of the Rome Statute. Russia’s conduct in the 21st century has been defined by aggression and incentivized by impunity, beginning with its invasions of Chechnya and Georgia, continuing with its seizure of Crimea, and culminating with its ongoing war of aggression against Ukraine. All of this took place amidst a continuing culture of impunity. And so, the Special Tribunal will have significant and lasting impacts, particularly by beginning the process of securing justice for the victims and accountability for the perpetrators, helping to deter future crimes of aggression, and reinforcing the principle that no state and no state leader is above the law.

Ukraine’s resistance to Russia’s unprovoked invasion is more than a national struggle. It is a defense of the rules-based international order that Canada has championed for generations. When a powerful state attempts to redraw borders by force, the consequences reverberate globally. For a country like Canada, this is not a distant conflict. It is a direct challenge to the principles that underpin global stability, security, and prosperity.

The Council of Europe and Ukraine have shown requisite leadership in advancing the Special Tribunal. Their efforts have resulted in the creation of a credible, legally grounded mechanism to prosecute the supreme international crime of aggression—the most important development since Nuremberg to hold accountable a state’s top leadership for the unlawful use of force.

But the Special Tribunal’s success now hinges on the appointment of experienced, independent personnel—a Prosecutor, a Registrar, and Judges—capable of navigating the complex legal and political terrain ahead. Canada has the expertise, the diplomatic weight, and the moral authority to help shape this process.

The Canadian government, as set forth above, has historically stepped forward at pivotal moments, demonstrating that effective action by middle powers can affect global change. Supporting the Special Tribunal is a natural extension of that tradition.

Joining the Enlarged Partial Agreement of the Special Tribunal would send a clear signal: Canada stands with the community of democracies in defending the prohibition on aggressive war. It would also strengthen the Special Tribunal’s legitimacy and encourage other states—especially within the G7 and broader international community—to follow suit. At a time when democratic norms are under strain, Canada’s leadership carries real weight.

For Canada, joining the Special Tribunal is not only a prudent geopolitical decision, but also a moral responsibility. It is about the Ukrainian people. As the Special Tribunal moves toward operational readiness, the victims of the conflict must remain at the center of the effort. Justice must be accessible, meaningful, and rooted in the lived experiences of those who have suffered. Canada’s record of supporting victim-centred approaches to international justice makes it well-positioned to ensure the Special Tribunal reflects these values.

The creation of the Special Tribunal is a historic opportunity to reinforce the rule of law at a moment when it is being threatened. Canada has an opportunity—and an obligation—to help make certain that Russia’s aggression is met not with impunity, but with accountability. That requires the Canadian government to take action now: joining the agreement, supporting the appointment of qualified personnel, and lending Canada’s voice to a coalition determined to uphold the most fundamental norms of international conduct.

Canada has led before. This is Canada’s moment to lead again. To champion, as a matter of principle and policy, the most significant advance in international criminal law in a generation. Not with rhetoric, but with resolve. By standing firmly behind the Special Tribunal, the Canadian government can help shape a more just and secure future—one where aggression is confronted, victims are heard, and the rule of law prevails.

Irwin Cotler is the International Chair of the Raoul Wallenberg Centre for Human Rights and former Minister of Justice and Attorney General of Canada and longtime Member of Parliament.

David M. Crane is a global leader in international criminal justice and the founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone. He has spent decades shaping accountability mechanisms around the world, including serving as a driving architect behind the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Crane is a distinguished scholar of international law, a former senior U.S. national security official, and a leading voice on the rule of law, state responsibility, and the legal limits on the use of force.


























































 

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            <item>
            <title>Iran, Israel, and the US: When Governments Lose the Language of Diplomacy, War Follows</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/05/iran-israel-and-the-us-when-governments-lose-the-language-of-diplomacy-war-follows/</link>
            <pubDate>Fri, 29 May 2026 12:46:35 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>AmirAli Maleki</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109627</guid>
            <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[“A man with an unpleasant voice was reciting the Qur’an loudly.


A wise-hearted passerby said to him, “What salary do you receive?”

He replied, “None.”

The man said, “Then why do you give yourself so much trouble?”

He answered, “I recite for God’s sake.”

The wise man said, “Then for God’s sake, do not recite.”

If you recite the Qur’an in this manner,

You will diminish the splendor of Islam.” (Saadi, Golestan, Story on the Qur’an reciter)

I was teaching logic when applause erupted from the neighboring classrooms. The rhythm was not festive; it was confirmatory, almost ritualistic. For a moment I persisted in speaking about syllogisms, about premises and conclusions, as though the architecture of reason could insulate the classroom from the tremor moving through the corridor. Yet the sound grew denser, more unified. When I opened the door, one of the boys looked at me and said, “Professor, they attacked.” That pronoun—they—was not merely grammatical. It was political. In its simplicity, it enacted the most fundamental distinction of the political: it constituted an enemy. I realized then that war does not begin with weapons. It begins with articulation. A city fractures linguistically before it fractures materially. From that moment emerged the question that governs this meditation: what occurs when sovereignty itself begins to stutter? Not when it is defeated, not when it collapses institutionally, but when it loses its capacity to articulate proportionately, intelligibly, and dialogically.

To understand this, one must begin not with geopolitics but with hermeneutics. Hans-Georg Gadamer reminds us that understanding is never complete. Human beings are always, in a profound sense, not fully justified in their claims. We never say exactly what ought to be said; we approach meaning asymptotically. This incompleteness is not a defect but a condition of dialogue. Because we cannot exhaust truth, we must enter conversation. Language, therefore, is structurally unfinished. What I call “stuttering” is, at the ontological level, universal. Every human articulation carries an element of insufficiency. Dialogue compensates for this insufficiency; openness sustains meaning. Yet when this ontological condition is denied or obstructed by political authority, stuttering transforms into structural instability, a linguistic fracture that endangers sovereignty itself.

Political stuttering begins when this ontological incompleteness is denied rather than mediated. When sovereignty constricts channels of dialogue—internally or externally—the natural incompleteness of language hardens into structural silence. The state does not cease speaking; it repeats. It oscillates between assertion and hesitation. It narrows diplomatic corridors while amplifying declarative rhetoric. This is no longer human finitude; it is political contraction. Internal disagreement ceases to be addressed proportionally, and the ruler’s words lose their capacity to orient, to instruct, or to unify.

Here, the classical insight of Al-Farabi acquires renewed urgency. In Fusul al-Muntaza‘a (Chapter 67), Farabi writes: “It is also tyranny that the ruler of the city becomes angry with a group who have committed a sin, yet the punishment he inflicts upon them—war and killing—is greater than what their sin deserves. Such punishment is undoubtedly injustice and oppression. Many there are who, by killing others, seek to cure their own anger and extinguish their resentment; yet they do not kill the one with whom they are angry, but instead kill the innocent who had no part whatsoever in producing that anger.” This passage reveals that injustice is not merely excess force; it is disproportion. The ruler who exceeds proportion ceases to address the people as a generality. He loses communicative measure. Anger replaces articulation. Punishment replaces persuasion. What appears as strength is already weakness: the inability to calibrate language to justice. Disproportionate punishment is not merely moral failing; it is linguistic failure. The ruler, in seeking to master the city through force, loses mastery over its articulation. The city does not simply resist; it becomes incomprehensible to those who govern it.

If we read this alongside Plato in Book V of the Republic, the problem sharpens. Plato distinguishes genuine war from stasis. War occurs between naturally distinct peoples; stasis is self-division. A people cannot coherently wage war against itself without dissolving its political identity. Civil war is self-mutilation. Yet the collapse of internal distinction is not only destructive; it is linguistically revelatory. It signals that the political language through which unity, justice, and authority are articulated has failed. Carl Schmitt translates this ontological distinction into the modern vocabulary of the political. In The Concept of the Political and later in Political Theology II, he differentiates between the public enemy (hostis) and the private adversary (inimicus). Sovereignty presupposes clarity in this distinction. When internal disagreement is elevated to existential enmity, the state confuses inimicus with hostis. It declares war where correction would suffice. In doing so, it erodes its own generality. Civil conflict, therefore, is not a stable political form; it is the sign of conceptual implosion. The collapse of the friend–enemy distinction within sovereignty generates linguistic breakdown: commands fail to convey intention, decrees fail to orient behavior, and silence expands among those who are governed.

If sovereignty begins to treat internal plurality as public enemy, it loses its linguistic position as sovereign. It no longer speaks for the whole. Its articulation ceases to correspond to the lived vocabulary of its society. This is the moment of severe stuttering. The state may still command, yet each command requires repetition because prior speech failed to generate shared understanding. Silence deepens internally—not necessarily visible silence, but communicative estrangement. Oscillation between assertion and hesitation dominates, not because strategy demands, but because comprehension is lost. Internal misarticulation produces defensive coercion, and coercion is mistaken for authority.

In the Iranian case, this estrangement has acquired structural dimensions. A digitally connected society maintains dense communicative ties with the global sphere—academic networks, economic exchanges, cultural circulation—while official diplomatic and discursive channels have progressively narrowed. The result is a divergence between societal articulation and sovereign articulation. The people increasingly perform the dialogical function that sovereignty has restricted. They create informal bridges to the world precisely because formal bridges have contracted. This inversion is politically decisive. When the communicative task of sovereignty migrates to society, the state’s stutter intensifies. Its oscillation between negotiation and threat, between openness and denunciation, reveals not strategic complexity but linguistic instability. Every attempt at external clarity is undermined by internal incoherence. The state projects power externally, yet internally, its language cannot sustain legitimacy.

Such instability cannot remain internal. Michel Foucault's panopticon offers the governing metaphor here: under conditions of global surveillance and interpretive scrutiny, nothing stays hidden for long. Here, the panopticon becomes international: the entire world functions as a lens and amplifier. Intelligence networks, financial oversight, treaty obligations, media infrastructures, and human rights regimes render every internal hesitation observable and interpretable. Misalignment between command and comprehension, silence and articulation, is translated into diplomatic suspicion, sanctions, and even military anticipation. The global panopticon interprets domestic stuttering as instability, and instability becomes an occasion for external intervention. Civil linguistic fracture projects outward as public conflict. Internal confusion produces external enemy. Here, the stuttering of sovereignty is not metaphorical; it is geopolitical. The state, having lost communicative proportion internally, seeks resolution by positing an unequivocal public enemy, yet this act can only exacerbate instability, producing a cycle in which the internal fracture shapes international confrontation.

The ethical dimension of articulation is captured with devastating economy by Saadi Shirazi in the parable above. Intention, Saadi reminds us, does not sanctify expression. Poorly executed speech can diminish the very truth it seeks to honor. The lesson is not irreverence; it is responsibility. Intention does not sanctify expression. Poorly executed speech can diminish the very truth it seeks to honor. Politically translated, excessive articulation without clarity weakens authority. There are moments when measured silence preserves sovereignty more effectively than incessant declaration. Strategic restraint is not weakness; it is linguistic discipline. In Iran, the repeated closure of channels of international dialogue illustrates precisely this dynamic. Stuttering arises when language is blocked, and louder speech cannot compensate. Responsibility demands both articulation and restraint, proportion and intelligibility.

This perspective carries profound implications for the understanding of postmodern international law. Law is not merely a set of rules nor is war merely an outcome of material force. Rather, both emerge from the coherence—or failure—of political language. Under the scrutiny of the global panopticon, every hesitation, every uncoordinated decision, is amplified, interpreted, and reacted to in ways that deepen instability. International tensions, including those involving Iran, the United States, and Israel, are intelligible as the external manifestation of internal stuttering: misaligned messages, obstructed channels of diplomacy, and constrained communicative pathways within sovereignty transform domestic fragility into geopolitical confrontation. Postmodern international law, therefore, becomes a lens through which the health of political language, the emergence of conflict, and the conditions for strategic restraint can be simultaneously understood, analyzed, and, where possible, mitigated. Clarity is power; restraint is strategy; stuttering is the prelude to war. This is the lesson of Farabi, of Schmitt, of Gadamer, of Saadi: governance depends on intelligibility, on ethical articulation, on the careful calibration of discourse. Force alone cannot substitute for understanding; sincerity cannot compensate for misarticulation. Political stuttering produces structural fragility, misperception, and conflict.

The boy in the classroom reflected this structural truth: a state fractures when language fails. In a panoptically observed world, stuttering is amplified and projected externally. The confrontation among Iran, the United States, and Israel is intelligible as the cumulative effect of communicative constriction, closure of diplomatic channels, and repeated misarticulation. Yet even here, the final observation emerges: the global panopticon renders every internal fissure visible. We are all, sovereign and subject alike, contained within a network of observation. The stutter is amplified, the silence interpreted, the oscillation read as threat. In this international panopticon, sovereignty is never a private possession; it is relational, linguistic, and ethical. Every failure of articulation becomes a site of conflict; every act of clarity becomes an instrument of legitimacy. War and peace, domination and survival, are inseparable from the state’s capacity to speak, to be heard, and to listen. The final lesson is stark and unambiguous: in a world in which all are observed, the ultimate power lies in language—not merely in the capacity to coerce, but in the capacity to articulate proportion, intelligibility, and ethical discernment.





AmirAli Maleki is a researcher specializing in international law and the philosophy of law, and the Editor of PraxisPublication.com. He works in the fields of political philosophy, Islamic philosophy, and hermeneutics. He is the recipient of JURIST's 2026 David M. Crane Rule of Law award.




]]></content:encoded>
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            <title>&#8216;Forever Barred and Precluded&#8217;: Trump&#8217;s IRS Settlement and the Architecture of Federal Immunity</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/05/forever-barred-and-precluded-trumps-irs-settlement-and-the-architecture-of-federal-immunity/</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 20 May 2026 12:05:30 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>Ingrid Burke Friedman | JURIST Editorial Director</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109616</guid>
            <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[The United States RELEASES, WAIVES, ACQUITS, and FOREVER DISCHARGES each of the Plaintiffs from, and is hereby FOREVER BARRED and PRECLUDED from prosecuting or pursuing, any and all claims, counterclaims, causes of action, appeals, or requests for any relief…

— From the Office of the Attorney General order signed by Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche, May 19, 2026
The federal government's enforcement powers can be set aside for a particular person in two recognized ways. A president can issue a pardon, which reaches federal criminal offenses but not civil liability or state action. A court can approve a settlement, which binds the parties to a case. This week, an acting attorney general signed a one-page order that establishes a third mechanism: a contractual release granting the president, his family, his trusts, and his businesses permanent immunity from federal law enforcement for anything the executive branch chooses to characterize as politically motivated. The order arises out of the settlement of Trump v. Internal Revenue Service. The headline event is the $1.776 billion Anti-Weaponization Fund, but a more consequential one sits below in paragraph C.

The two recognized mechanisms come with constraints. The pardon power is limited by its constitutional text to federal criminal offenses; it cannot reach civil liability, state action, or any agency's prospective regulatory authority. The judicial settlement is limited by the case-or-controversy requirement, by the scope of the claims actually before the court, and by judicial supervision. Each mechanism is bounded by something. The third mechanism, as the order constructs it, is bounded by nothing. The release is contractual rather than constitutional. The executive branch in this case performed the work of all three: legislating the scope of the immunity in lieu of Congress, adjudicating the underlying dispute in lieu of a court, and committing itself to enforce the result. If this order stands as a lawful exercise of executive authority, federal immunity from law enforcement becomes whatever the executive branch decides to release. The central question this settlement presents is not whether the IRS lawsuit had merit, nor is it whether the Anti-Weaponization Fund will survive its inevitable challenges; it is whether the executive branch can confer on itself by contract an immunity that neither the Constitution nor the courts have ever recognized. The rule of law cannot accommodate a federal enforcement scheme in which the answer is yes.

Paragraph C of the order, which establishes the funding requirements for the Anti-Weaponization Fund created by the Trump v. IRS settlement, runs just eight lines. In them, the US, through its Department of Justice, "RELEASES, WAIVES, ACQUITS, and FOREVER DISCHARGES" each of the plaintiffs from any claim that has been or could have been asserted against them. The plaintiffs are President Donald Trump, Donald Trump Jr., Eric Trump, and the Trump Organization. The release also extends to all "related or affiliated individuals (including, without limitation, family or others filing jointly), or parties including trusts, parent, sister, or related companies, affiliates, and subsidiaries."

The language in that last clause reaches the entire Trump family, every Trump entity, and every Trump trust.

The release is not bounded by the underlying case. It runs to (1) any matter "raised or could have been raised" in the case; (2) "Lawfare and/or Weaponization"—capitalized defined terms whose definitions are hidden away in a Settlement Agreement that has not been made public;* and (3) "any matters currently pending or that could be pending (including tax returns filed before the Effective Date) before Defendants or other agencies or departments."

The release does not stop at the IRS or the Treasury. It sweeps in every executive-branch component—DOJ, FBI, SEC, FinCEN, any agency—for any matter that could be characterized as "Lawfare" or "Weaponization." The federal government, by contract, has agreed never to pursue Trump, his family, his trusts, or his businesses for anything that meets that definition, forever.

The president cannot pardon himself for civil matters; the pardon power, by its constitutional text, reaches only "Offences against the United States." For the same reason, he cannot grant himself immunity from state action. And even as to federal crimes, the self-pardon question is contested at best—the Office of Legal Counsel concluded in 1974 that "under the fundamental rule...no one may be a judge in his own case, the President cannot pardon himself." No court has held otherwise since.**

Even the most expansive recent uses of the pardon power confirm these limits. On his last morning in office, President Biden issued preemptive pardons to his brothers James and Francis, his sister Valerie Biden Owens, and two of their spouses, anticipating prosecutions by the incoming administration. The pardons drew sustained bipartisan criticism. But valid though these concerns may have been, the pardons operated within the constitutional architecture: they covered only federal criminal offenses, were publicly attributed, named their recipients, and reached neither civil liability nor state action nor any agency's prospective regulatory authority.

The release at issue here has none of those limits. It covers civil matters, his family, his entities, regulatory examinations, and forecloses both known and unknown claims. Settlement releases are routine; what is not routine is the scope. An ordinary government settlement releases the government's claims arising out of the lawsuit at hand. This one releases the government's claims arising out of anything that could be characterized, by the executive branch itself, as politically motivated. That is the difference between using an existing mechanism and constructing a new one.

The release covers "examinations or similar or related reviews…including tax returns filed before the Effective Date." That encompasses the entirety of the IRS audit power. The Internal Revenue Code grants the IRS—not the Attorney General—independent statutory authority under 26 U.S.C. § 7602 to examine any return and to determine its correctness. The Code does not contemplate the Attorney General contractually waiving that authority on behalf of the IRS. The DOJ has broad settlement authority over federal tax litigation, but it is at minimum a serious question whether that authority extends to a prospective contractual waiver of the IRS's future examination authority over unrelated returns. The order's answer to that question is to assume it can. Rather than offering a defensible application of existing authority, the order simply assumes that the executive branch's authority extends as far as the administration needs it to.

The order is signed by Acting Attorney General Todd Blanche, who, before becoming Deputy Attorney General, was Donald Trump's personal criminal defense attorney in the 2024 federal criminal proceedings against the man who is now the sitting president. He signs as Acting AG because, in early April, Trump fired the confirmed Attorney General, Pam Bondi, following sustained reporting that he was frustrated with her insufficient pursuit of his political opponents. The president then installed his former defense lawyer, who signed an order granting that former client — and the client's family, trusts, and business empire — permanent release from federal liability. The conflict of interest is on the face of the document; so is the chain of events that produced it. The signature is not incidental to the release. It is part of how the third mechanism works: when internal checks on executive overreach become inconvenient, they are removed. The pattern is not without analogues abroad. Russian President Vladimir Putin built his "power vertical" on the same principle: institutional officials who declined to act on political directives were replaced with those who would.

The Anti-Weaponization Fund will almost certainly face legal challenge. The US Constitution's Appropriations Clause provides that money may be drawn from the Treasury only by an act of Congress. The Fund's $1.776 billion disbursement comes from the Judgment Fund, a permanent appropriation set aside to pay court judgments and settlements against the federal government. Without underlying congressional authorization for a program of this kind, that disbursement presents a clear constitutional problem.

The release, by contrast, will not be tested in the same way. The lawsuit from which it issues was voluntarily dismissed by the plaintiffs under Rule 41(a)(1)(A)(i) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, which permits a plaintiff to withdraw a case unilaterally, without judicial approval, so long as the defendant has not yet formally responded. The dismissal took effect the instant it was filed, foreclosing the court from considering whether the lawsuit met Article III's requirement that federal courts decide only genuine disputes between parties with opposing interests. No court will now scrutinize the settlement that resulted. The release binds the United States as a matter of contract law, at least for now.

The order purports to bind the United States, but it does not bind the states themselves. The release language only extends to federal actors. State attorneys general and district attorneys retain every state-law authority they held last week, both as to existing matters and as to anything that may yet arise. Existing convictions in state courts, outstanding civil judgments, and investigations currently in progress are not within the release's reach. Nor are investigations and prosecutions that have yet to be opened. None of these should be treated as foreclosed.

The release does not bind future Congresses, a fact that could have imminent practical consequences given this year’s midterm elections. The Judgment Fund is a statutory creation, amendable by statute. Congress has every authority it had last week to condition further disbursements, claw back unappropriated balances, or require congressional approval for settlements that exceed a defined threshold. This is the obvious legislative response, not just to this settlement, but to the next one. A Congress that wishes to retain its power of the purse in any meaningful sense must legislate that power back into operative force.

The release does not bind future Department of Justice administrations. A future DOJ that concludes the order exceeded the Attorney General's lawful authority — particularly with respect to IRS examination authority under 26 U.S.C. § 7602, which the Internal Revenue Code does not assign to the AG — has every legal basis to argue the release is ultra vires: a Latin doctrinal term meaning that an act taken in excess of the actor's lawful authority is, by definition, void. Given the unorthodox origins of the release, an ultra vires argument would likely face contract-law challenges. The strength of any such argument tomorrow depends on how seriously the legal academy and the practicing bar develop its constitutional and statutory defects now.

The release does not bind the public's access to it. The Settlement Agreement that supplies the definitions of "Lawfare" and "Weaponization," the terms doing most of the operational work in paragraph C, remains undisclosed, leaving us with only guesses as to how expansive the order truly is. Freedom of Information Act requests and litigation, congressional oversight, and discovery in any collateral proceeding are the existing tools for compelling its release. Transparency about what the federal government has actually agreed to is imperative; it is the predicate for every other remedy.

Blanche's order says "FOREVER," in capital letters, twice. Forever is a claim, not a fact. And the document does not bind the institutions that will decide whether it remains true. The states, future Congresses, future DOJ administrations, the bar, the press, the courts that have yet to scrutinize this order face a choice. They can treat this settlement as an aberration to be litigated around, or they can treat it as what it is: a template that, if it stands, will be used again — not only by this administration, but by every administration that follows. The architecture of federal immunity was not built to absorb a third mechanism. Whether it does will not be decided by the order. It will be decided by them.

Notes

* That a federal release of this scope rests on terms the public cannot read is itself the problem; the definitions could in principle be narrow, but the government's decision to withhold them does not narrow the document the public can read.

** Some readers will ask why Trump v. United States is not the operative authority here. The Court's 2024 decision held that former presidents have absolute immunity for actions within their "core constitutional powers," presumptive immunity for other "official acts," and no immunity for "unofficial acts." It addresses criminal prosecution for conduct in office. It does not reach pardons, civil liability, regulatory examinations, family members, or business entities. The release at issue here is broader than anything Trump v. United States held, and it was accomplished by contract rather than by the Court.

Ingrid Burke Friedman is JURIST News' editorial director.]]></content:encoded>
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            <title>From Tokyo to The Hague: How a 1946 Tribunal Continues to Shape the Laws of War</title>
            <link>https://www.jurist.org/commentary/2026/05/from-tokyo-to-the-hague-how-a-1946-tribunal-continues-to-shape-the-laws-of-war/</link>
            <pubDate>Wed, 06 May 2026 13:10:15 EDT</pubDate>
            <dc:creator>David M. Crane | Founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone</dc:creator>
                            <category><![CDATA[Uncategorized]]></category>
                        <guid isPermaLink="false">https://www.jurist.org/commentary/?p=109607</guid>
            <description><![CDATA[]]></description>
            <content:encoded><![CDATA[Eighty years ago, on May 3, 1946, the International Military Tribunal for the Far East opened its proceedings in Tokyo. The world was still reckoning with the devastation of the Second World War, and the tribunal represented one of humanity’s earliest attempts to articulate a legal response to mass atrocity, aggressive war, and systematic violations of human dignity.

The Tokyo Trials were not perfect, but they marked a decisive moment in the evolution of international criminal law. They affirmed that leaders could be held accountable for decisions that unleashed catastrophic violence, and that atrocities committed under the banner of state authority were not immune from judgment.

When the Tokyo proceedings began, the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg was halfway through its work. The two tribunals focused on accountability. Their beginnings were different—one an international effort created by agreement in London in 1945, the other an order by the Supreme Commander for the Allied Powers to create a court that would prosecute senior Japanese leaders for their destruction of nations and peoples in that region.

A Turning Point in the Law of War and Peace

The tribunal’s most enduring contribution was its insistence that aggressive war itself is a crime. This principle, first articulated at Nuremberg and reinforced in Tokyo, reshaped the postwar international order. It laid the groundwork for the United Nations Charter’s prohibition on the use of force and influenced the development of later institutions, including the International Criminal Court.

The Tokyo Trials also advanced the idea—still contested, still evolving—that individuals, not abstract entities, bear responsibility for the gravest violations of international law. Military commanders, political leaders, and civilian officials were called to answer for decisions that led to widespread suffering across Asia and the Pacific. This was a profound shift from a world in which war was considered a sovereign prerogative beyond legal scrutiny.

A Complex Legacy

The legacy of the Tokyo Trials is layered. Scholars have long debated issues of victor's justice, procedural fairness, and the uneven treatment of certain categories of crimes. These critiques are part of the historical record and essential to understanding the tribunal’s limitations.

Yet even with these imperfections, the tribunal’s broader legacy endures:

 	It helped establish individual criminal responsibility for wartime atrocities.
 	It reinforced the principle that leaders cannot hide behind the state and are personally responsible for their acts.
 	It contributed to the global movement toward codifying crimes against humanity.
 	It demonstrated that the international community could attempt to respond to mass violence through law rather than vengeance.

The Tokyo Trials did not close the chapter on wartime accountability; they opened one. Their influence can be traced through the ad hoc tribunals of the 1990s, the creation of hybrid courts, and contemporary efforts to address aggression and atrocity crimes in conflicts around the world.

Why the 80th Anniversary Matters

Commemorating the 80th anniversary is not merely an act of historical reflection. It is a reminder of the ongoing struggle to uphold the rule of law in times of conflict. The principles tested in Tokyo—accountability, justice, and the rejection of impunity—remain central to global efforts to confront atrocities today in Ukraine as well as Venezuela and Iran. The unilateral use of force has become foreign policy in this new age of aggression.

The tribunal’s legacy challenges the international community to continue strengthening mechanisms that protect civilians, deter aggression, and ensure that those who commit grave crimes are held to account. It also underscores the importance of fair, transparent, and impartial legal processes—standards that modern institutions must continually strive to meet.

A Legacy Still Unfolding

The Tokyo Trials were a beginning, not an endpoint. Their legacy lives on in the legal frameworks that govern armed conflict, in the institutions that seek justice for victims, and in the enduring belief that even in the aftermath of unimaginable violence, the law can serve as a path toward accountability and peace.

Eighty years later, the world continues to grapple with the same fundamental questions the tribunal confronted: How do we restrain the use of force? How do we protect human dignity in war? How do we ensure that those who violate the most basic norms of humanity are held responsible? And how do we support and sustain organizations chartered to maintain international peace and security?

David M. Crane is a global leader in international criminal justice and the founding Chief Prosecutor of the UN Special Court for Sierra Leone. He has spent decades shaping accountability mechanisms around the world, including serving as a driving architect behind the Special Tribunal for the Crime of Aggression against Ukraine. Crane is a distinguished scholar of international law, a former senior U.S. national security official, and a leading voice on the rule of law, state responsibility, and the legal limits on the use of force.

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